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NOTES
PRISON OVERCROWDING AND RHODES V. CHAPMAN• 1
DOUBLE-CELLING BY WHAT STANDARD?
A record number of adult felons are currently housed in American penal
institutions, 2
 largely because of public reaction to the rising incidence of
crime.' Yet prison capacity has not matched the influx of inmates: two out of
every three inmates have less than the national standard of cell space.' This
overcrowding often causes serious institutional problems, such as rampant
violence,' as well as severe individual injuries, such as mental and emotional
maladies leading to psychiatric commitment' or suicide.' State inmates have
argued that prison overcrowding inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment. 8 In Rhodes v. Chapman 9 this constitutional
1 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
2 Krajick, Annual Prison Population Surrey: The Boom Resumes, 4 CORRECTIONS MAC. 16,
17 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Krajickj. On January 1, 1981 there were 320,583 adult felons serv-
ing at least a one year sentence. Id. at 17. This represents a 42% increase since 1975. Id. In the
first half of 1981 the prison population continued to rise. 12 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER 2 (Oct.
26, 1981) (citing the Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin Prisoners at Midyear 1981).
"Corrections experts interviewed attribute much of the current increase to harsh
new laws, the rising violent crime rate and demographic factors. In many states, the number of
people committed to prison per capita and the length of the terms have gone up." Krajick, supra
note 2, at 17. Parole boards are also acting conservatively. Id. This attitude towards offenders af-
fects the incarceration rate. Only South Africa and the Soviet Union have a higher rate of in-
carceration than the United States. AMERICAN INST. OF GRIM. JUST., Just the Facts 3 (1980).
• See 12 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER 5-6 (April 13, 1981), reporting the conclusions of a
congressionally mandated study by Abt Associates, commissioned by the National Institute of
Justice. The national standard of cell space for a one man cell of 60 square feet was set by the
Department of Justice. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at 2404 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS, Standard No.
2.04, at 17 (1980). The Abt Associates report stated that eight to ten billion dollars would be
needed to give the current prison population 60 square feet of cell space each. 12 CRIM. JUST.
NEWSLETTER 5, 6 (April 13, 1981). The study also concluded that any supplemental increase in
facilities would currently result in short-lived overcrowding relief and perhaps an absolute in-
crease in the number of prisoners held in substandard conditions. Id. at 5.
• See cases cited at note 331 infra.
6 See cases cited at note 337 infra.
7 See cases cited at note 334 infra.
a The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The
eighth amendment is applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, see Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), which provides in part: "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
4 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
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issue was squarely before the United States Supreme Court for the first time.
In Rhodes, the conditions of confinement at the Southern Ohio Correc-
tional facility were at issue. The institution was at 138% capacity.'° This over-
crowding was proved to have caused primarily psychological harms." The
Rhodes Court held that, in the conditions existing at the prison, double-ceiling
— the practice of housing two prisoners in a one man cell — of long-term in-
mates did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment."
This note discusses the eighth amendment analysis relevant to prison
overcrowding cases generally, and the importance of Rhodes to future eighth
amendment litigation." First, an historical analysis of prisoners' rights will be
presented, followed by an overview of lower federal court overcrowding deci-
sions. This overview will introduce a two-tier framework of review through
which overcrowding cases herein will be analyzed. Next, relevant Supreme
Court decisions of the last decade evaluating the eighth amendment and
prisoners' rights will be discussed. The background and holding of the Rhodes
decision will then be presented. A critique of the opinion will follow, suggesting
that the Court's eighth amendment analysis fails to offer a coherent and
substantive framework for lower courts to apply in prison overcrowding cases.
Illustrations of this failure, in two post-Rhodes decisions, will be considered.
Finally, an objective standard of review will be set forth as a recommendation
of how eighth amendment rights, in the context of overcrowded prisons, can
best be safeguarded.
I. THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL CLAUSE PRIOR TO RHODES V CHAPMAN
The eighth amendment evolved in sentencing cases, from a narrow pro-
scription on the use of gross, physical punishments, to a broad prohibition on
nonpatent, psychological punishments. Yet the treatment of incarcerated of-
fenders went largely unquestioned by federal courts until the 1960's. In the
1970's numerous federal courts evaluated the constitutionality of prison over-
crowding but applied nonuniform standards of review. Within the last decade
the Supreme Court resolved a number of eighth amendment and prison condi-
tion questions but the reasoning of these decisions also appears inconsistent.
Nevertheless, a full analysis of the constitutional themes presaging the Rhodes
decision yields workable guidelines to be applied in prison overcrowding cases.
'° Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
" See text at notes 219-29 infra.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2397.
" Pretrial detainees' condition of confinement rights will not be thoroughly discussed.
Jail conditions will be evaluated, however, where convicted prisoners are housed therein. Also,




A. Development of the Eighth Amendment and Prisoners' Rights
The English Declaration of Rights Act of 1688 contained a provision pro-
hibiting the use of cruel and unusual punishment. ' 4 This provision became the
language of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.is
American courts, therefore, initially interpreted the amendment to cir-
cumscribe only those punishments proscribed by the English Act. Citizens
could not be subjected to "inhumane, barbarous and torturous"
punishments' 6
 that existed in Stuart England" or were unknown at common
law." This restrictive interpretation of the amendment comported with early
American society's view that prisoners were slaves of the state possessing no
justiciable rights. 19
 Only the most brutal of punishments, such as pillory, could
be redressed by federal courts. 2°
As the democracy grew, the clause was viewed as unnecessary in a free
republic which, through its system of checks and balances, prevented the
judiciary from inflicting arbitrary punishments." Moreover, the amendment
14
 An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succes-
sion of the Crown, 1 W. & M. 2d Sess. ch. 2 (1688). This declaration was based upon principles
in the Magna Carta. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); Note, The
Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, And The Enlightenment: An Historical Justification For The Weems v.
United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783, 787 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Excessive Punishment Doctrine].
" Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, reh 'g denied, 330 U.S. 853
(1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890). See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Granucci]; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-22 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
16
 Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38, 43 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938
(1960); Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801, ref 'g
denied, 332 U.S. 821 (1947).
"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or lingering death . . . . [The Con-
stitution] implies there is something inhuman and barbarous." In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
447 (1890). This case cites examples of such punishments as "burning at the stake, crucifixion,
breaking on the wheel or the like." Id. at 446.
Examples of such punishments included having the prisoner drawn and dragged to
the place of execution, embowelled alive, beheaded and quartered, dissected in public and
burned alive. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 376-77 (W.
Lewis ed. 1897) (cited in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-6 (1878)).
18 In Re Pinaire, 46 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
18
 "A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in the
penitentiary instead of with death, is subject while undergoing that punishment, to all the laws
the Legislature in its wisdom may enact for the government of that institution and the control of
its inmates . .. . He is for the time being the slave of the State." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. 1024, 1026, 21 Gratt. 790, 795-6 (1871).
2° See, e.g., In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889). In Birdsong, the federal prisoner
was chained around the neck with a trace chain and padlocked such that he could not lie or sit
down for at least three hours in the nocturnal solitude of his dark cell. Id. at 602. The court
equated this life threatening punishment with "pillory" which was abolished in France in 1832,
in England in 1837 and in the United States in 1839. Id.
2 ' Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910).
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was deemed outmoded by the more civilized norms of American morality that
prevailed at the turn of the twentieth century. 22 These norms influenced the
kinds of punishments the courts meted out, thereby eliminating the use of bar-
barous cruelties.
In Weems v. United States, 23 however, the Supreme Court revived the eighth
amendment. In Weems, the Court ruled that the Philippine Islands' statutory
punishment for the crime of making false entries on public records was cruel
and unusual." Weems' punishment included a fine of over six times the sum of
the false entry, fifteen years imprisonment in chains at hard and painful labor,
lifelong surveillance, and the loss of numerous political, familial and property
rights." The Weems Court held that this criminal sanction violated a precept of
justice inherent in the eighth amendment, namely, "that punishment for [a]
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense." 26 In reaching this
conclusion the Court reevaluated the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
in adopting the eighth amendment. The Court found that punishments chosen
by the legislature could be as cruel as those inflicted in Stuart England though
not physically barbarous. 27 The scope of the clause, the Court concluded, must
evolve with enlightened public opinion to ensure a humane system of justice."
Consistent with the Weems decision, the Court in Trop v. Dulles" ruled that
denationalization as a punishment for wartime desertion was unconstitutional.
The Court found that the emotional injury caused by such a punishment was a
form of torture the eighth amendment could not sanction." A plurality of the
Court declared that "the basic concept underlying the eighth amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man ... the words of the Amendment are not
precise and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society. "$ 1 Thus, the Court reaffirmed that, at least in sentencing cases,
22 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 694 (8th ed. 1927);
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967); Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32
N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause And The Substantive Criminal
Lam, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 637 (1966).
23 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
24 Id. at 377.
25 Id. at 363-66.
" Id. at 367. Some commentators believe this was the original purpose of the clause. See
Granucci, supra note 15, at 843-44; Excessive Punishment Doctrine, supra note 14, at 787. These com-
mentators are critiqued in Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis And The Compelling
Case Of William Rummel, 71 J. OF GRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 378, 380-82 (1980).
27 21 .7 U.S. at 372.
28 Id. at 378.
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
" Id. at 101. A plurality opinion of four Justices stated that "the total destruction of the
individual's status in organized society ... is a form of punishment more primitive than
torture." Id. These Justices concluded that to allow the punishment would condone "a fate of
ever-increasing fear and distress." Id. at 102. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, stressed "the
consequent psychological hurt" of the penalty. Id. at 111 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 100-01. The opinion noted that in a United Nations survey of 84 nations only
two imposed denationalization as a penalty for desertion. Id. at 103.
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nonphysical punishments could be sufficient to invoke the protection of the
eighth amendment.
In sum, the Court in both Weems and Trap indicated that judicial review
would be exercised to check legislative abuse in the selection of punishments."
The Weems standard of review evaluated whether the punishment was justly
proportioned to the gravity of the crime committed. The Trap standard of
review focused on whether the punishment comported with man's dignity
based on evolving norms of decency. Both the Weems and Trap Courts con-
sidered evidence of mental and emotional harm. Moreover, both decisions
evaluated the clause's proscription largely in light of a changing public con-
science.
Notwithstanding the Weems and Trap pronouncements, federal courts
breathed no life into the eighth amendment once a citizen was sentenced. Still
clinging to the view that prisoners lacked justiciable rights under the clause,"
the courts, except in extreme cases," abstained from close scrutiny of inmate
life. The federal courts routinely declined subject matter jurisdiction of
prisoner mistreatment claims. This approach, termed the "hands-off" doc-
trine," had several justifications. The principles of federalism, 36 when dealing
with state prisoners, and separation of powers 37 were routinely invoked.
" The legislature was said to lack "unrestrained power" to punish. Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. at 381. Accord, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100.
" See note 17 supra; "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying
our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
34 The language used by federal courts in such cases is highly presumptive of the
absence of a justiciable right. See Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 506 (10th Cir. 1969) ("clear
abuse or caprice"); Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1967) ("extreme cases");
Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1965) ("only in a rare and exceptional situation");
United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965) ("extreme cases where the Bureau
of Prisons or the Attorney General acts arbitrarily or fraudulently or abuses its authority");
Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1963) ("unless vindictive, cruel or inhuman");
Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 431 (D. Md. 1966) ("exceptional or extreme").
" This term is attributed to Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal Prison Inmates 31 (1961)
(Document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons). See Note, Beyond the Ken of Courts: A Cri-
tique Of Judicial Refusal To Review The Complaints Of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506, 506 n.4 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Beyond the Ken]. The doctrine provides that "[C]ourts are without power to
supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary rules or regulations ... No
authorities are needed [for] support." Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 859 (1954).
36
 "A federal court has no jurisdiction to supervise the administration of a state
penitentiary by its warden." Oregon v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1957). See also Hat-
field v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); United States ex
rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953); Kelley v. Dowd, 140
F.2d 81, 82 (7th Cir. 1944); United States v. Jones, 108 F. Sum). 266, 269 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
37 We strongly suspect that many traditional and still widespread penal practices
. . . take an enormous toll, not just of the prisoner who must tolerate them at
whatever price to his humanity and prospects for a normal future life, but also
of the society where prisoners return angry and resentful . . . [B]ut the prop-
er tools for the job do not lie with a remote federal court. The sensitivity to
local nuance, opportunity for daily perseverance, and the human and
718	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:713
Moreover, the federal judiciary deemed itself wanting of sufficient penological
expertise to decide such cases" and unable to fashion remedies that would not
upset institutional discipline and security. 39 Finally, these courts feared that
allowing prisoners effective access to the courts would open a floodgate of litiga-
tion. 4° Even those plaintiffs who succeeded in articulating a substantive claim
often faced a choice of narrowly tailored remedies.'"
The federal judiciary of the 1960's, however, extended its power of review
to reach prisoners' complaints. Stemming from the belief that prisoners are
monetary resources required lie rather with legislators, executives and citizens
in their communities.
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). See also
United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d
548, 550 (4th Cir. 1963); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951); Stroud v. Swope,
187 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853
(9th Cir. 1951); Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 304 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
as
 Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude towards
problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various
limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institu-
tions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary percep-
tions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention
. . . [T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable,
and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by
decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commit-
ment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government . . . [C]ourts are ill
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison adminstra-
tion and reform.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974). See also Sastre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
39
 "We incline to the proposition that to allow such actions would be prejudicial to the
proper maintenance of discipline." Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
See also Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845, 846 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965);
Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 551 (4th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Sta-
tion WENR, 209 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953).
40 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tatum, J., concurring);
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
4 ' See generally Note, Judicial Intervention In Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
178, 179-81 (1967); Beyond the Ken, supra note 35, at 508. Specifically, habeas corpus was ineffec-
tive. "It is not the function of habeas corpus to direct prison officials in the treatment and care of
inmates." United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 985 (1965); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact Of An Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 1315 (1961). Contra, Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 444 (6th Cir. 1944), writ dis-
missed, 148 F.2d 278, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). Coffin, however, was the minority view.
Comment, Constitutional Rights Of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985, 1008
(1962). Use of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (28 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976)) was also limited. See Note,
Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270 (1969). Mandamus was unavailing, see
Beyond the Ken, supra note 35, at 514, as was tort law, see Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment,
59 YALE L.J. 800, 801 (1950).
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citizens who lose only those rights incidental to incarceration,'" these courts
rebutted the rhetoric of the hands-off era.°
This jurisprudential metamorphosis began in 1962 when the Supreme
Court applied the eighth amendment directly to the states through the four-
teenth amendment." The Court further declared that federalism should no
longer remain a barrier to effective relief for prisoners subjected to constitu-
tional deprivations. 45 To ensure the proper exercise of judicial review in
prisoner rights cases the courts struck a balance of authority among the
branches of government." This balance was recognized as necessary because
of the political powerlessness of prisoners: their voices could only be effectively
heard in the judicial forum. 47
Other hands-off precepts were also refuted. Judicial expertise was recog-
nized as more capable of understanding and furthering penological goals, in
42 See Jacob, Prison Discipline And Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 228
(1970); Barkin, The Emergence Of Correctional Law And The Awareness Of The Rights Of The Convicted,
45 NEB. L. REV. 669 (1966); Note, judicial Intervention In Corrections, The California Experience — An
Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 452, 455 (1973); Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983,
57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1275 (1969). Federal courts increasingly accepted the view that "[a] prisoner
retains all the rights of ordinary citizens except those expressly, or by necessary implication,
taken from him by law." Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), writ dismissed,
148 F.2d 278, cm. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
+3
 See generally Haas, judicial Politics And Correctional Reform: An Analysis Of The Decline Of
The "Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795 [hereinafter cited as Haas].
44 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
" In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) exhaustion of state remedies before use of
42 U.S.C. c 1983 was ruled unnecessary, 365 U.S, at 184, since state relief was "not available in
practice." Id. at 174. In Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) the Court allowed a
state prisoner to bring an action under the Civil Rights Act. Id. The philosophy of the Court at
this time was:
[W]e yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights
under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudica-
tion, and that we have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other
forum.
McNeese v. Board of Educ. for Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 674 n.6 (1963), quoting Stapleton v.
Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan.), app. dismissed pursuant to stip. sub nom. McElroy v.
Mitchell, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).
+6 " [A] mere grant of authority [to the Bureau of Prisons] cannot be taken as a blanket
waiver of responsibility in its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested with extensive ad-
ministrative responsibilities. But it does not follow that their actions are immune from judicial
review." Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 150, 150
(1963). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962); Johnson, The Constitution And The Federal District Judge, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 903 (1976).
4 ' Prisoners are denied many political rights and opportunities. See Millemann, Protected
Inmate Liberties: A Case for judicial Responsibility, 53 OR. L. REV. 29, 39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Millemann]; Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in
Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367 (1977); Note, The Role of the Eighth Amendment in
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some cases, than the apparent incompetence or impotence of prison officials."
Ample precedent was developing in analogous administrative areas, such as
education and welfare," to justify judicial involvement and to help tailor
remedies that did not threaten prison security." The courts increasingly ques-
tioned whether concerns of security and discipline excused abusive treatment
of prisoners." Such justifications for abuse were found unsubstantiated in
fact, 52
 as studies revealed that good security was directly related to meaningful
court access."
With respect to the last rationalization of the hands-off doctrine, prevent-
ing a flood of inmate petitions, the courts recognized that the fear of
voluminous litigation was secondary to individuals' rights." Moreover, as
Prison Reform, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 650 (1971); Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv, 929 (1970).
48
 [Courts] cannot, without defaulting in our obligation, fail to emphasize the
imperative duty resting upon higher officials to insure that lower echelon
custodial personnel are not permitted to arrogate to themselves the functions
of their superiors. Where the lack of effective supervisory procedures exposes
men to the capricious imposition of added punishment, due process and
eighth amendment questions inevitably arise.
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966). Even prison officials with good inten-
tions often lack the resources to be effective in furthering penological goals. See Millemann, supra
note 47, at 40.
49
 A good example of such judicial intervention was the courts' role in school desegrega-
tion. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Clay v. United States, 403 U.S.
698 (1971) (draft boards); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare officers).
5° See Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1972); Comment, Equitable
Remedies Available To A Federal Court After Declaring An Entire Prison System Violates The Eighth Amend-
ment, 1, CAP. U.L. REV. 101 (1972); Comment, Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role of the
Federal Judiciary in State Prison Reform, 7 CUM. L. REv. 31 (1976). See generally, Chayes, The Role Of
The Judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293-96 (1976); Eiseberg & Yeasell,
The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Special
Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978).
51
 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969) (use of jailhouse lawyers cannot be com-
pletely banned); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (racial segregation
cannot be justified by security concerns); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 24 (5th Cir, 1969)
(cannot suppress freedom of religion); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(first amendment); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968) (corporeal punishment)
Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S 988 (1966) (religion); Ed-
wards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (medical care and court
access). See also Jacob, Prison Discipline & Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 228
(1970).
52 See note 51, supra,' Note, Prison Restrictions — Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sul. 386, 387 (1968).
53 See, e.g., Cardarelli & Finkelstein, Correctional Administrators Assess the Adequacy and Im-
pact of Prison Legal Services Programs In The United States, 651 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 91 (1974).
Experience teaches that nothing so provokes trouble for the management of
a penal institution as a hopeless feeling among inmates that they are
without opportunity to voice grievances or to obtain redress for abusive or
oppressive treatment. It is common knowledge that many prison riots have
been in protest of abuses in disciplinary cell blocks.
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966).
54
 "While we recognize that our decision in this case may result in some increase in the
filing of similar complaints in the district courts, we cannot flinch from our clear responsibility to




prisoners learned the extent of their rights and legal clinics helped eliminate
frivolous claims," the initial boom in litigation soon quieted." Accordingly,
the Supreme Court extended the availability of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (28
U.S.C. 1983) by reevaluating congressional intent in passing the Act and
concluding that a section 1983 action could be maintained without first
exhausting state remedies. 57 The application of other federal remedies for state
prisoners also was broadened. 58
The recognition that prisoners' constitutional rights endured beyond their
date of sentencing ensured inmates of their rights to free speech, religion and
due process of law." Moreover, the eighth amendment was applied to prisoner
mistreatment cases in conformity with the standards of review employed in the
sentencing decisions of Weems and Trap. For example, prison disciplinary
measures entailing both physical and psychological injury, such as strip cell
confinement," were ruled violative of the clause. 61 Nonphysical punishments
alone, such as loss of parole, 62 were also ruled unconstitutional. The courts,
(2d Cir. 1967). See also United States ex rd. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958), followed in Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961).
55
 Haas, supra note 43, at 827. See generally Bluth, Legal Services For Inmates: Co-opting The
Jailhouse Lawyer, 1 CAP. U. L. REV. 59 (1972); Wexler, Counseling Convicts: The Lawyer's Role In
Uncovering Legitimate Claims, 11 ARIZ, L. REV. 629 (1969); Comment, The Federal Bureau Of Prisons
Administrative Grievance Procedure: An Effective Alternative To Prisoner Litigation?, 13 AM. GRIM. L.
REV. 779 (1976).
56 Haas, supra note 43, at 824, noting that federal litigation in other areas has grown at
a faster rate. Id. at 825. See also McCormack, The Expansion Of Federal Question Jurisdiction And
Prisoner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 523, 535-36, arguing that the volume of prisoner
complaints is exaggerated and most cases are resolved quickly. Contra, Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S.
1, 8 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
57 See note	 supra.
58 For a discussion of habeas corpus see Note, Developments In The Law — Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV, L. REV. 1038, 1079-87 (1970); Note, Habeas Corpus v. Prison Regulations: A Strug-
gle In Constitutional Theory, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 50 (1971); Comment, Unconstitutional Prison Condi-
tions as a Ground for Habeas Corpus Relief in Extradition Proceedings, 49 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 64
(1980). For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (28 U.S.C. § 1983) see Note, Prisoners'
Rights Under Section 1983, 57 CEO. L.J. 1270 (1969). For a discussion of mandamus and tort law
see Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 257-58, 261 (1970).
59 [O]ur cases have held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and
religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, that they are protected
against invidious discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they may claim the pro-
tection of the Due Process Clause to prevent additional deprivations of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (citations omitted).
60 "[The condition of the strip cell] could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and
undermine the sanity of the prisoner." Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967);
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966). Generally, a strip cell is a punitive
isolation cell that is near barren in which a prisoner may be deprived of essentials such as cloth-
ing, heat and light for several days.
61 "Apart from physical danger, confinement in the Penitentiary involves living under
degrading and disgusting conditions." Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)
(totality of conditions); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (whippings); Han-
cock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 792 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (dry cell).
62 United States ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
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therefore, finally extended judicial review to protect sentenced citizens from
cruel and unusual punishments.
In sum, the eighth amendment evolved from a narrow proscription on the
arbitrary infliction of barbarous punishment by tyrants to a guarantee that no
individual can be subjected to any form of criminal punishment that affronts
the dignity of man. Prisoners were no longer viewed as slaves of the state, but
as citizens protected by evolving interpretations of the eighth amendment. By
1970 federal courts were closely scrutinizing prison disciplinary measures. The
next step was to determine if ongoing conditions of confinement, such as over-
crowding, could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
B. Eighth Amendment Analysis in Overcrowding Cases
During the hands-off era, inmate complaints regarding overcrowding
were quickly dismissed. 63
 In the 1970's, however, federal courts actively pro-
tected the right of inmates to certain minimal conditions of incarceration man-
dated by the eighth amendment." When Rhodes v. Chapman was decided, some
twenty-three state prisons were under court order resulting from unconstitu-
tional prison conditions which included overcrowding. 65
 The standards of
review employed by these courts in their eighth amendment analyses, however,
were not uniform. Thus, nearly identical facts could lead different courts to dif-
ferent conclusions.
To assist in resolving this lack of uniformity, this note sets forth a two-
tiered framework for evaluating prison overcrowding claims. The first level of
inquiry involves a factual approach to the conditions of confinement under
challenge. Courts have differed on the range of conditions considered relevant
to a prison overcrowding claim. Varying factual approaches can often deter-
mine the outcome of a case. At the second level of analysis, a test of cruel and
unusual punishment is applied to a fact or fact group derived from the first tier.
Again, varying tests have led courts to different results. Although no court has
expressly evaluated an eighth amendment, prison overcrowding claim within
this framework of review, 66
 every such decision lends itself to this analysis. The
63 See, e.g., Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951). In Pickens, the court
denied a pre-trial detainee's petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 290. In rejecting the detainee's
eighth amendment overcrowding claim the court reasoned that soldiers in Korea were "undergo-
ing hazards a thousand times as great and suffering 'cruel and inhuman punishment' far more
terrible than" petitioner was. Id.
°' See, e.g., Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). The court declared
that in overcrowding cases the obligation of judicial "review does not depend upon what the
Legislature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon what Respondents
[State Officials] may actually be able to accomplish. If [the State] is going to operate a Peniten-
tiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by the Constitution of the
United States." Id. at 1212-13 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971)).
65 12 CR1M. JUST, NEWSLETTER 6, 6-7 (Feb. 16, 1981). The District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands' institutions were subject to a similar order. Id. at 7.
66 Compare Justice Brennan's remarks in Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at 2407-08
(Brennan, J., concurring). See note 417 infra.
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following subsections enumerate and evaluate each formula applied by federal
courts in their eighth amendment analyses.
1. The First Tier: Applying An Approach to Assessing the Conditions of Con-
finement
Traditionally, prisoner complaints of cruel and unusual punishment in-
volved a single issue, such as corporeal punishment. 67 Gradually, however,
federal courts came to recognize that even though a given problem by itself
may not affect an inmate to an unconstitutional degree, the totality of adverse
conditions within a prison may amount to a cruel and unusual punishment's
For example, in Williams v. Edwards69 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the combined effect of conditions such as overcrowding, violence, im-
proper classification, fire and safety hazards, health and sanitation problems,
and inadequate staffing resulted in an eighth amendment violation." Although
only a minority of courts have actually considered every adverse prison condi-
tion as a whole," the vast majority of federal courts have adopted this totality
approach at least in name," because as a realistic measure of prison conditions
67 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
68 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp, 362, 372-73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
69 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
'° Id. at 1211.
7 ' See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan,
611 F.2d 1039, 1044-46 (5th Cir. 1980); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974),
enforced, 407 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Balton v. State Gov't of N.C., 501 F. Supp. 1173,
1179 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616
F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886,
896 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 121 (D.D.C. 1976);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978);
Costello v. Wainright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 23 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325
(1977); Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F.
Supp. 411, 419 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 483,
reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
72 Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1194
(D. Conn. 1980); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir.), aff'g in part 485 F. Supp. 122,
155 (D. Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1368
(5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1980); Burks v. Teasdale,
603 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1979), aff'g Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 487 (W.D. Mo. 1978);
Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir.), aff'g in part Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp.
727, 734 (D. Md.), and Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 657 (D. Md. 1980); Battle v.
Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 400, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir.
1977); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 F,2d
1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974), enforced, 407 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503
F. Supp. 1265, 1286 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modd, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Batton v. State
Gov't of N.C., 501 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F. Supp.
1276, 1294 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 36 (D.P.R. 1979); Ruther-
ford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D. Cal. 1978); MCI Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall,
447 F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Mass. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I.
1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980); West v. Edwards, 439 F.
Supp. 722, 725 (D.S.C. 1977); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 896 (N.D. Fla. 1976);
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this approach is more likely to ensure an equitable resolution of prisoners'
claims." In Hutto v. Finney'  the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of the totali-
ty approach in the similar context of punitive isolation cells."
Yet a variant of the totality approach can be used to distort the effect of
prison conditions. The various positive aspects of confinement, such as three
meals a day and recreation time, can be said to compensate for the negative
conditions, such as overcrowding and inadequate medical care. 76 This
"broad" totality approach, however, skews the actual effect the conditions
have on those prisoners within the plaintiff class who are subjected only to the
detrimental elements. Every prisoner will be faced with different conditions
depending on factors such as work availability, cell location, and health.
Because some inmates will be exposed only to the negative elements of confine-
ment, the totality approach does not offer them protection unless only the
negative elements are considered. Most courts failing to find an eighth amend-
ment, prison overcrowding violation have used this broad totality approach."
The totality approach that considers only negative conditions has been
criticized for entailing too intrusive and subjective an evaluation by federal
district court judges." For example, in Wright v. Rushen79 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court had engaged in the legislative
function of prison reform by using the totality approach as a key to opening the
door of federal "supervisorial powers."" By lumping numerous minor prob-
lems together, the totality approach arguably exaggerates the effect on the im-
prisoned and results in needless federal intervention in state affairs. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals in Wright examined each condition separately and
found no eighth amendment violation. 8 ' The court found authority for this ap-
Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 121 (D.D.C. 1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.
Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Costello v. Wain-
wright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 33 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325 (1977);
Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411,
419 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 483, reh'g denied,
421 U.S. 971 (1975).
73 The belief that a piecemeal approach may not be effective and that judicial economy
will be enhanced if numerous issues can be resolved in one suit are secondary reasons which sup-
port use of the totality approach. See Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, And Evolving Standards
Of Human Decency: On Guessing, Stressing, And Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 KAN. L. REV. 551,
562 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Robbins].
7* 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
75 The Court held that the interdependent conditions in Alabama's isolation cells,
viewed as a whole, constituted cruel and unusual punishment to those inmates confined therein
for more than thirty days. Id. at 688.
76 See, e.g., Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1977); Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d
740, 742 (4th Cir. 1976); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 487 (E.W. Mo. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979); West v. Edwards, 439 F. Supp, 722, 725-26
(D.S. C. 1977).
" See, e.g., cases cited at note 76 supra.
78 See Note, Federal Courts And State Prison Reform: A Formula For Large Scale Intervention Into
State Affairs, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 545 (1980).
79 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1981).
u° Id. at 1132-33.
81 Id. at 1133-34.
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proach in the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish" where double-
bunking of short-term pre-trial detainees was ruled not violative of the fifth
amendment. Dictum in Bell had recommended that federal courts defer to state
decisionmakers' prison policies." The Wright court, therefore, adopted a nar-
row focus approach to circumscribe judicial involvement with state prisons."
The use of a narrow focus approach, however, may also lead to a more
searching scrutiny of an isolated aspect of prison life. Based on expert
testimony and correctional standards of what constitutes adequate cell space,
some lower courts have found overcrowding "unconstitutional per se.""
Other courts have closely evaluated various deficiencies in the basic necessity
of "shelter," such as overcrowding, poor lighting, sanitation and ventilation,
and fire hazards." Moreover, in many'prison overcrowding cases the swollen
populations were found to be the sole cause of physical, mental and emotional
injury resulting from the strain on limited staff and facilities." Most courts,
therefore, by focusing on the amount of space, the numerous aspects of decent
shelter, or the wide-ranging effects of overcrowding, have found an eighth
amendment violation through a more probing use of the narrow focus ap-
proach than the Wright court had employed.
82 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
a' Id. at 562.
84
 642 F.2d at 1132. The court also stated "a focus on costs will tend to stay the hand of
a district court when its otherwise generally praiseworthy compassion might tempt it to adopt an
unnecessarily expensive and comprehensive remedy." Id. at 1134. The court did concede that
"[of course, each condition of confinement does not exist in isolation; the court must consider
the effect of each condition in the context of the prison environment, especially when the ill-
effects of particular conditions are exacerbated by other related conditions." Id. at 1133. Yet the
court still found that overcrowding and other problems did not justify the injunction. Id, at
1133-34. For another case employing a narrow focus approach to find no constitutional violation,
see Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp, 104, 109 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
" See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732, 743 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d
1241 (5th Cir. 1977); Nicholson v. Choctaw County, Ala., 498 F. Supp. 295, 308 (S.D. Ala.
1980) (dictum).
86 See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'g 485 F. Supp.
122, 155 (D. Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F. Supp.
1276, 1294 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 36 (D.P.R. 1979); MCI
Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Mass. 1978),
87 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g in part, 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1194 (D. Conn. 1980); Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir.), aff'g in
part Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 734, and Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 657 (D.
Md. 1978); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 400, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.
Supp. 1265, 1286 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495
F. Supp. 802, 810-12 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated,
652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981). For example, the Federal District Court for the District of Oregon
in Capps noted:
Overpopulation at these facilities has had a negative effect on nearly every
aspect of the inmates' lives. . . . [I]t has increased the health risks to which
prisoners are exposed [such as] communication of contagious diseases. . . [and]
risks the creation or aggravation of gastric illnesses by eating hurriedly (eating
time has been reduced to 20 minutes) in a noisy, crowded, stressful
environment. . . .
Inmates ... who are already ill or injured are less likely to receive proper
medical care....
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In sum, the totality of conditions approach, which evaluates only the
negative conditions of confinement, was developed in prison condition cases as
the best measure of prisoners' plight. Conversely, the broad totality approach,
which balances both positive and negative aspects of confinement, skews the
evaluation by considering the average prisoners' circumstances only. Similar-
ly, the narrow focus approach, which considers the various aspects of prison life
separately, was designed to limit a federal court's inquiry into state prison life.
The narrow focus approach, however, can also accurately reflect the adversity
of prison conditions through an exhaustive scrutiny of a sole condition. A
court's philosophy towards state prisoners' constitutional rights — conser-
vative or progressive — appears to affect which analytical approach a court will
take with respect to conditions of confinement, and how that approach will be
applied. In the first tier, therefore, the outcome of a case depends upon both
the analytical approach taken with respect to the conditions of confinement,
and the judicial philosophy reflected in that approach towards prisoners'
rights. Once the conditions under challenge are assessed, however, the analysis
must proceed to the second tier to resolve the eighth amendment claim.
2. The Second Tier: Applying a Test of Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In the second level of eighth amendment analysis courts apply a test of
cruel and unusual punishment to each fact or fact group derived from the first
tier. Without Supreme Court guidance, however, confusion initially resulted
as to which test should be used in prison overcrowding, eighth amendment
litigation. Eight tests emerged for evaluating such claims. These tests query
whether the punishment: is disproportionate to the severity of the crime; ex-
ceeds legitimate penological aims; inflicts unnecessary and wanton pain; is
totally without penological justification; comports with society's evolving sense
The ability ... to deal with the mental health problems of the prisoners is
similarly impeded. .. .
[T]he rehabilitation efforts . . . also have been hampered. . .. [O]vercrowding
at [these] levels ... undermines the initiative of inmates to seek self-improvement
and prevents their rehabilitation... .
The problems associated with overcrowding naturally create feelings of frustra-
tion among inmates. At the same time, overcrowding diminishes the opportunities
for inmates to effectively deal with their frustration . .. . [there is] a loss of area
for free movement land also] of whatever modicum of privacy and quiet a prison
affords. Visitation periods have been shortened. . . . Lines at canteens have
grown longer and longer. Recreation areas sometimes cannot accommodate all in-
mates desiring to use them. Rather than serving as an arena for the release of ten-
sion, the prison yard has become a breeding ground for conflict... .
[T]he increased potential for violence is one of the most significant effects of
overcrowding. .. . [S]evere overcrowding prevents the development of ap-
propriate social skills and leads instead to aggressive, violent, and destructive
behavior patterns. . . . [S]tudies of penal institutions reveal that overcrowding
leads to depression, tension, and increases in disciplinary infractions, assaults and
suicide attempts. . . .
[O]vercrowding has increased the likelihood that inmates will suffer physically
at the hands of other inmates.
Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. at 810-12 (conclusions of court and experts).
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of decency; exists by denial of basic necessities; shocks the conscience of the
court; or affronts the dignity of man. Often courts have applied these bench-
marks in various combinations. 88
These eight tests entail four kinds of analysis: proportionality, balancing
of interests, contemporary norms of decency, and human dignity. By
evaluating how each of these four groups operates within the framework of
prison overcrowding, eighth amendment analysis, the appropriateness of each
test can be discerned.
a. Proportionality
The proportionality test determines whether a particular punishment is
excessive in relation to the severity of the crime committed. 89 In Weems u. United
States the proportionality test was first used by the Supreme Court to strike
down a sentencing statute that was unconstitutional in degree. 9° Such a test is
not particularly suited to overcrowding cases, however. Prison overcrowding
cases concern the kind, not the degree, of punishment. 91 More importantly,
because overcrowding cases are usually brought in the form of a class action,
this test cannot be used where offenders of mixed culpability are suing
together. 92 The proportionality test, therefore, is not useful in evaluating ongo-
ing conditions of confinement."
88 One commentator has calculated the frequency with which various tests have been
applied. He found the following: (1) shock the conscience test, 41% (district court) and 45%
(court of appeals); (2) totality of the circumstances test, 45% and 18%; (3) least restrictive
means test, 34% and 18%; (4) balancing test, 45% and 27%; and (5) evolving standards of
decency test, 66% and 27%. Fair, The Lower Federal Courts as Constitution Makers: The Case of Prison
Conditions, 7 AM. J. GRIM. LAW 119, 137, 139 (1979). (Note that no two-tiered eighth amend-
ment analysis was used by this commentator.) No doubt this multiple use of tests was due to a
desire to ensure no reversible error. For example, one court found that "the conditions of plain-
tiffs' confinement so shock the conscience as a matter of elemental decency and are so much
more cruel than is necessary to achieve a legitimate penal aim that such confinement constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment." Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (E.D. La. 1970).
89 Prison disciplinary cases likewise involve an assessment of whether the sanction was
properly graduated to the rule infraction. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 646
(E.D. Va. 1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.
Supp. 1014, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal.
1966). See generally Note, Decency And Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role In Prison Reform, 57 VA. L.
REV. 841, 852-55 (1971).
98 See text at notes 22-26 supra.
91 This "degree" versus "kind" distinction was first made by the Court in Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910). In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) the court
declared:
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes the criminal process in
three ways: First, it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those
convicted of crimes, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble . . . Trap v. Dulles . . . second, it pro-
scribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, e.g.,
Weems v. United States ... and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can be
made criminal and punished as such, e.g., Robinson v. California.
Id. at 667.
92 Robbins, supra note 73, at 554-55 n.29.
" See Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v.
Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN.
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b. Balancing of Interests
A second test sometimes applied in eighth amendment litigation evaluates
whether a given punishment exceeds a legitimate penological aim, as balanced
against the rights of prisoners. This balancing test is derived from due process
discipline," due process detainee overcrowding, 95 and first amendment"
cases. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union," for example, the Su-
preme Court held that the restriction on prisoners' first amendment right to
labor union organization was justified by the legitimate penological objective of
maintaining security. 98 Because this balancing test was used in Jones and other
recent non-eighth amendment prison cases, some lower federal courts have ap-
plied this benchmark to overcrowding cases and found no constitutional viola-
tion. 99
The legitimate penological aim test, however, has three significant
drawbacks. First, by focusing on security issues, this test relegates prisoners'
eighth amendment rights to secondary importance.'" While eighth amend-
ment analysis historically has focused on the effect of the punishment on the in-
dividual, the legitimate penological aim test arguably does provide protection
from cruel and unusual punishment since this test requires prison officials to
justify their acts through a "purposive analysis. Yet commentators believe
that prison officials' explanations for challenged practices have been to easily
accepted by the courts.'" Second, consideration of state interests confers a near
presumption of validity on any purported justification for overcrowding.' 03 Yet
such a presumption is unwarranted since overcrowding is usually the product
of apathy or poor planning,'" not conscious design, so officials often have no
L. REV. 893, 903-04 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Robbins & Buser]; Robbins, supra note 73, at
554-55 n.29. This test has been mentioned in some overcrowding cases but not applied. See, e.g. ,
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.
1981); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 480 (W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Burks v.
Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979).
94 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
95 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
96 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 130-31 (1977).
97 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
98 Id. at 132.
9° See, e.g., Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1976); Rutherford v. Pitchess,
457 F. Supp. 104, 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Contra, Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D.
Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other
grounds, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
'° The test should not look to the purpose of confinement, only the effect. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 ' Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 686-88 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Com-
ment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 367, 393-404 (1977).
1 ° 2 Robbins & Buser, supra note 93, at 905 (citing Kaufman, Prison: The Judge's Dilemma,
41 FORDHAM L. REV. 495 (1973)).
'" Id.
I" See text at notes 272, 287-89 infra and Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 656 (D.
Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
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real basis for explanation. Moreover, because studies reveal that prison per-
sonnel are poorly trained and educated, 105 ad hoc rationalizations made by such
personnel should be carefully reviewed. Finally, the danger of judicial subjec-
tivity is inherent in the legitimate penological aim test. When evaluating an en-
tire prison system's totality of conditions, at the first tier of inquiry, the
justifications for every condition, introduced at the second tier of analysis,
becomes so voluminous that the use of experts and studies is rendered imprac-
tical.' 08 Thus, courts are likely to defer to proffered explanations.'"
A third test of cruel and unusual punishment, related to the legitimate
penological aim test, assesses whether a given punishment inflicts "un-
necessary and wanton pain.' "° 8 This test is sometimes infused with language
of a rehabilitative penal purpose, focusing on whether inmates will degenerate
because of conditions which inflict needless suffering. 109 The pain test evaluates
whether there is a rational basis for the punishment and whether the sanction is
inflicted with the intention of causing distress. This test, therefore, focuses on
the justifications offered by prison officials for the punitive conditions, not on
the individual's plight. In essence, a balancing test, similar to that of the
legitimate penological aim test, is entailed. The attendant problems of focusing
away from the individual, according deference to state rationalizations and en-
couraging judicial subjectivity in evidence evaluation are, therefore, also pres-
ent. Moreover, "pain" connotes immediate physical injury. Yet prison over-
crowding cases usually involve graduated harm that may be partly mental or
emotional. Thus, this test is not well suited to the prison overcrowding context.
A fourth test, also akin to the legitimate penological aim test, determines
whether a punishment is "totally without penological justification.""° This
benchmark implies that a punishment may lack a complete justification yet still
10 Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional
Litigation, 47 U.Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1, 22 (1978).
1 ° 6 Robbins, supra note 73, at 554-55 n.29; Robbins & Buser, supra note 93, at 905.
1 ° 7 See sources cited in note 106 supra.
ma See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 402 (10th Cir. 1977); Crowe v. Leeke,
540 F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1976); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 33 (D.P.R. 1979);
Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 813 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 132 (D.
Colo. 1980), aff'd in part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1759 (1981);
Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Levine,
588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978). •
L 09 See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'g 485 F. Supp. 122,
132 (D. Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393
(10th Cir. 1980); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp, 802, 813 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443
F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980);
Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 123 (D.D.C. 1976); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F.
Supp. 411, 419 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983,
reh. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
"° See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1194 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part,
651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 980 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd,
616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016,
1019 (E.D. La. 1970).
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pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, courts applying this test have granted
relief only when confronted with gross overcrowding problems."' This
conservative benchmark also entails the aforementioned problems of improper
focus, unjust deference to state rationalizations, and judicial subjectivity in
evidence evaluation, since the focal point is again state justifications.
c. Contemporary Norms of Decency
The test of cruel and unusual punishment most frequently applied by the
courts is the "evolving sense of decency" test." Derived from Trop v. Dulles, "'
this test evaluates whether a punishment comports with enlightened notions of
justice and contemporary norms. Uncertainty has arisen in eighth amendment
litigation, however, regarding what type of evidence establishes such norms.
The evidence relied upon often decides the outcome of the suit." 4 Never-
theless, what constitutes proper evidence, under the decency test in the context
of prison conditions seems well settled. In Estelle v. Gamble," where failure to
"' See, e.g. , cases cited in note 110 supra.
" 2 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g 507 F. Supp.
1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1980); Battle v.
Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 402 (10th Cir. 1977); Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1977);
Batton v, State Gov't of N.C., 501 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Hutchings v. Corum,
501 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 33 (D.P.R.
1979); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 813 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 480-81
(W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979); Rutherford v.
Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D.
Md.), aff'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Levine,
450 F. Supp. 648, 653 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); MCI Concord Ad-
visory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Mass. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp.
956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); West v.
Edwards, 439 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D.S.C. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732, 743 (N.D.
Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 896
(N.D. Fla. 1976); Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 120 (D.D.C. 1976); Pugh v.
Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub won. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Costello
v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 33 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.) rev'd on
other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325 (1977);
Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
" 3 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See text at note 31 supra.
"4 Fair, The Lower Courts as Constitution Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7 Am. J. of
CRIM. L. 119, 130 (1979). For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1975), the Supreme
Court ruled that Georgia's death penalty statute did not violate the eighth amendment. Id. at
169. The joint opinion (Justice Powell and Justice Stevens joined in the opinion announced by
Justice Stewart) largely relied on evidence of state legislative opinion that the statute was com-
patible with contemporary norms. Id. at 174-75. In dissent, Justice Marshall reached a contrary
conclusion by considering only the opinion of those citizens properly informed about capital
punishment. Id. at 232. Also dissenting, Justice Brennan argued that a judicial notion of what is
necessary to preserve the dignity of man, considered in light of society's mores, should determine
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. Id. at 229. Gregg thus delineates three possible indicia
of contemporary norms of decency. Such norms could be established with evidence of state
legislation, informed public opinion, or judicial notions of the dignity of man.
" 5 429 U.S, 97 (1976).
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provide medical treatment created an eighth amendment violation,"°' the
Supreme Court relied upon legislation and correction agency standards in its
decency test analysis.'" Similarly, in overcrowding cases, lower federal courts
have applied correctional standards of government and private agencies as sup-
ported by expert opinion.' 18 Given the absence of statutes proscribing max-
imum prison populations, however, these courts have not found legislation ap-
plicable. 18 International minimum standards have also helped some federal
courts evaluate contemporary norms.' 2°
Recently, some courts have found correctional standards too inflexible to
establish contemporary norms of decency in unique prison settings."' These
courts have channelled expert information through a number of factors rele-
vant to a particular prison to ensure equity in process and result. The Federal
District Court for the District of Oregon in Capps v. Atiyeh' 22 used this method
to determine that overcrowding constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Five factors were used: the length of confinement, the number of prisoners
above the institution's design capacity, the cell size and daily cell time, the
mental and physical health effects of overcrowding and the permanency of the
overpopulation.'" This method probably stems from the Supreme Court's dic-
tum in Bell v. Wolfish' 24 where the fifth amendment was at issue. The Bell Court
had stated that correctional standards regarding cell size only indicate agency
goals and therefore cannot set the constitutional minima."' Nevertheless, the
" 6 Id. at 104.
" 7 Id. at 103-04 & n.8.
" 8 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g 507 F. Supp.
1177, 1192-93 (D. Conn. 1980); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 n.10 (10th Cir.), aff'g 485
F. Supp. 122, 134 (D. Colo. 1980); Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 506-07 (8th Cir.
1980); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1977); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp.
1265, 1282 n.21 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modd, 650 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1981); West v. Lamb, 497 F.
Supp. 989, 999-1000 (D. Nev. 1980); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 35-36 (D.P.R.
1979); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 809-10 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehn-
quist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F.
Supp. 104, 109 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 731 (D. Md.), aff'd in part
sub nom. Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp.
956, 979-80 n.30 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980);
Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1119 (D. Del. 1977).
"9 Ste, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 2411 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Levine, 450 F.
Supp. 648, 656 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
120 See Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g in part 507 F. Supp.
1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980). International standards were also helpful in In re Birdsong, supra
note 20, and Trop v. Dulles, supra note 31.
121 See, e.g. , Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1979); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F.
Supp. 802, 814 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652
F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 154 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 639 F.2d
559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); MCI Concord Advisory Bd, v. Hall,
447 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D. Mass. 1978).
' 22 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice),
vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981).
223 Id. at 814.
22♦
 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
125 Id. at 543-44 n.27; see text at note 192 infra.
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Capps court regarded correctional standards and expert opinion as persuasive
evidence in finding an eighth amendment violation. Thus, whether or not such
evidence is channelled through factors relevant to a particular prison, a result
based on this modified application of the deceny test remains an extremely ob-
jective one. 126
Courts have applied two other benchmarks related to the decency test: the
basic necessities test and the shock the conscience test. The basic necessities test
provides that the eighth amendment is not violated where a penal facility "fur-
nishes adequate food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, medical care and personal
safety.'" 27 Adequacy is established through the use of the same type of objec-
tive evidence used in the decency test, such as correctional standards, expert
testimony and penological studies. Although this test seems to focus on
physical essentials, adequate shelter is evaluated in light of an inmate's total,
including psychological, cell space needs.'" Application of the basic necessities
test, therefore, should produce a result similar to that of the decency test.
A seventh test of cruel and unusual punishment, also related to the decen-
cy test, is one which embodies the evolutionary nature of the eighth amend-
ment. This benchmark determines whether prison conditions "shock the con-
science" of the court. 129 This test, however, is better suited to analyzing in-
stances of gross physical punishments, not everyday conditions of
confinement.'" Psychological, long-term or aggregate harm is not usually so
obvious as to be immediately offensive. More importantly, what punishment
16 See generally Hirshkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L.
REV. 759 (1969).
127 See, e.g. , Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 112 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J., concurr-
ing and dissenting); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Wolfish v.
Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978)); Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1977);
Newman v. State of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds,
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Adams v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 302, 308 (M.D. Ala.
1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1980); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 33 (M.D.
Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325 (1977).
128 Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981).
125 This test apparently was derived from the phrases "shock the sensibilities" in
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910) and "shock[ing] the most fundamental in-
stincts of civilized man" in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947) (Bur-
ton, J., dissenting). This test has also been termed to question whether a punishment evokes "a
cry of horror." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
This test.has been applied in the overcrowding decisions of Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740, 742
(4th Cir. 1978); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 481 (W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd sub corn. Burks v.
Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979); MCI Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 348,
404 (D. Mass. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616
F.2d 598 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp,
119, 121 (D.D.C. 1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); White v. Sullivan, 368 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Ala. 1973); Johnson
v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (S.D. Mo. 1973).
"° Robbins, supra note 73, at 554; Robbins & Buser, supra note 93, at 902-03.
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shocks the conscience is highly subjective."' Prison officials cannot readily ad-
just their conduct to conform to what a few judges may consider shocking.'"
d. Human Dignity
The broadest and final test applied by lower federal courts in this second
tier of eighth amendment analysis evaluates whether overcrowding affronts the
"dignity of man. '"" This benchmark stems from the notion that the Constitu-
tion is immortal and therefore the proscription on cruel and unusual
punishments must be based on an evolving judicial conscience. 134 Rather than
rely on contemporary norms, courts applying this test evaluate whether a
punishment "transgresses today's broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity and decency."' 35 In focusing on the individual,
the most enlightened notions of morality are considered. Although this test ap-
pears to require a wholly subjective evaluation, reliance on leading penological
opinion coupled with judicial experience can render uniform results.
In sum, the eighth amendment standard of review used by lower federal
courts in overcrowding cases is best illustrated through a two-tiered analysis.
In the first tier the conditions of confinement under challenge are evaluated.
The totality of conditions approach that considers only the negative aspects of
confinement best measures prisoners' hardships. A comparable measure exists
when an exhaustive scrutiny of overcrowding is taken. Conversely, the narrow
focus approach was designed to limit judicial involvement in prison life by ig-
noring interdependent conditions of confinement. This restriction of judicial
review can also be achieved where negative and positive aspects of confinement
offset each other through a broad totality approach.
In the second tier, varying combinations of eight tests of cruel and unusual
13 ' Robbins & Buser, supra note 93, at 902; Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging
Judicial Role In Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841, 848 (1971). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) (test applied to due process clause).
137 Robbins, supra note 73, at 554; Robbins & Buser, supra note 93, at 903 (citing Kauf-
man, Prisons: The Judge's Dilemma, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 495, 508 (1973)).
' 33 This phrase is derived from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion). See text at note 31, supra. This test has been applied in Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 105
(2d Cir. 1981), aff'g in part 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980); Campbell v. Cauthron,
623 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1980); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 402 (10th Cir. 1977); Bat-
ton v. State Gov't of N. C., 501 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Hutchings v. Corum,
501 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp, 14, 33 (D.P.R.
1979); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 813 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 480
(W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979); Rutherford v.
Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D.
Md.), aff'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); MCI Concord Ad-
visory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Mass. 1978).
"4 See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
135 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976) quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
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punishment have been applied to the fact or fact group derived from the first
tier. The proportionality test is of doubtful usefulness in these cases because of
its inability to evaluate the kind, rather than degree, of punishment to a
heterogeneous group of inmates. Balancing tests are likewise inappropriate in
prison overcrowding cases. The legitimate penological aim test employs a
balancing process which entails focusing away from the individual's plight, ac-
cording unwarranted deference to state rationalizations and encouraging
judicial subjectivity in evidence evaluation. The pain test shares the same
flaws, and focuses only on physical injury. The totally without penological
justification test also involves the problems of a balancing test and sets so low a
threshold that almost any punishment can be sanctioned. All three balancing
tests, therefore, dilute the historical protection of the eighth amendment.
The three forms of the decency test, which center on contemporary norms,
may also be unsuitable for these cases. The evolving sense of decency and the
basic necessities tests are more objective than the foreoing benchmarks only
when expert penological opinion is evaluated. In such instances these tests may
achieve an equitable result. The third form of decency test, the shock the con-
science test, however, evaluates conditions of confinement too subjectively and
focuses only on physical harm. Finally, the dignity of man test uses progressive
penological opinion to achieve a result consonant with judicial conscience,
which may not be consonant with popular mores. This test, therefore, best en-
sures that constitutional, not political, precepts determine the scope of the
clause's proscription.
Whatever test a court uses will be applied to the condition or conditions
under challenge derived from the first tier of inquiry. As illustrated above, the
approaches and tests used vary considerably in their effectiveness in fulfilling
the eighth amendment's guarantee in the prison overcrowding context. As will
be more fully demonstrated in later sections of this note, this diversity often
reflects distinct philoSophies towards prisoners' rights and federalism which
underlies every court's eighth amendment analysis. The Supreme Court bears
partial responsibility for this lack of uniformity in lower federal court decisions.
As the following material demonstrates, the Supreme Court's eighth amend-
ment analysis did not address the problem of prison overcrowding until Rhodes
v. Chapman.
C. The Burger Court
During the last decade, the Supreme Court has consistently expressed a
strong interest in hearing prisoners' complaints, 136 although the Court has
been criticized for avoiding the resolution of substantive inmate rights issues
"6 Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward
problems of prison administration . . . But a policy of judicial restraint can-
not encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims
whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or
practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-06 (1974). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 32
(1972) (per curiam).
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once the complaints are heard.'" Nevertheless, the Court had articulated a
workable framework for resolving prison overcrowding disputes prior to Rhodes
u. Chapman.
The application of the eighth amendment to prison living conditions
first's arose in Estelle v. Gamble.'" In Estelle, the inadequate medical treatment
of an inmate was at issue.'" The Court declared that the eighth amendment
does not proscribe only physically barbarous punishrnents; 141 rather, the clause
embodies the broader concept of man's dignity. 112 The Estelle Court then enun-
ciated four eighth amendment tests: a punishment could violate the clause if
such treatment transgresses "evolving standards of decency,'" 43 entails the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, 144 isI " grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime, "145 or goes beyond the "substantive limits of what
can be made criminal and punished." 146 Finding modern legislation' 47 and
correctional standardsl" the manifestation of contemporary norms of decency,
the Court held that "deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs would
constitute an eighth amendment violation.'"
In Estelle, Justice Stevens vehemently dissented because of his belief that
the eighth amendment entails minimum objective standards of decency."° He
reasoned that the character of the punishment is at issue in eighth amendment
cases, not the motivation of prison officials."' Justice Stevens feared that in-
jury resulting from incompetency in staffing or inadequacy in facilities would
go unredressed under the majority's analysis if prison officials professed they
'" See Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correc-
tional Litigation, 47 Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV, 1 (1978); Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1977).
138 In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976) (per curiam), the Court dismissed the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after argument was heard. The Fourth Circuit had
found an eighth amendment violation in the use of isolation cells. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d
357, 367-68 (4th Cir. 1975).
I" 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
' 4° Id. at 99-101.
14 ' Id. at 102 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality
opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
142 Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
'" Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1975) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
144 Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg. v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1975) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Louisiana ex rd. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S, 459, 463
(1947); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879)).
145 Id. at 103 n.7 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
146 Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)).
' 47 Id. at 103 (citing 22 state statutes in n.8).
146 Id. at 103 n.8.
149 Id. at 104. This ruling was consistent with those in the federal courts of appeal that
allegations of mere malpractice would not state an eighth amendment cause of action. Id. at 106
n.14.
"° Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 ' Id. at 116-17 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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acted in good faith. 152 Nevertheless, the Estelle Court's reliance on legislation'"
and administrative agency standards" 4 had arguably not resulted in the use of
a wholly subjective and toothless test.
Although Justice Stevens was unable to convince the majority to accept his
eighth amendment analysis in Estelle, two years later he wrote the Court's opin-
ion in Hutto v. Finney. 155 In the Hutto litigation, overcrowding and other condi-
tions of the Arkansas penal system were challenged. 156 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the eighth amendment required that a 30-day limit
be placed on the use of punitive isolation cells.'" The Hutto Court upheld the
time limitation imposed by the district court because of persuasive expert
evidence which established that prolonged overcrowding had contributed to
violence and vandalism. 1 " Articulating a totality of conditions approach,' 59 the
Court declared that "a filthy overcrowded cell and a diet of ' grue' might be
tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or mon ths. ' , 160 The pro-
portionality and dignity of man tests were applied to penological evidence to
find an eighth amendment violation."' The Court gave great deference to the
findings of the trial judge, relying on both his years of experience with the
problem and his recognition of the proper limits of a federal court's authority to
intervene in the operations of a state institution.'"
Outside the prison context, two other decisions illustrate the Burger
Court's evolving, and generally consistent, interpretation of the eighth amend-
ment. In Gregg v. Georgia, 163 the Court found Georgia's death penalty statute
did not violate the clause. Five members of the Court agreed that "the basic
concept underlying the eighth amendment is the dignity of man ." ' 64 The joint
opinion'" reiterated the four tests of cruel and unusual punishment mentioned
152 Id.
153 See note 147 supra.
1" See note 148 supra.
'" 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
156 Id. at 680-84.
"' Id. at 680. The other issue on appeal was whether the Department of Corrections
should pay the attorney's fee award. Id. With respect to the isolation cells the Court noted that
"[a]n average of 4, and sometimes as many as 10 or 11, prisoners were crowded into windowless
8' x 10' cells containing no furniture other than a source of water and a toilet that could only be
flushed from outside the cell." Id. at 682. There were problems with infectious disease. Id.
"[O]vercrowding led to persecution of the weaker prisoners." Id. at 684. Vandalism was ramp-
ant. Id. Guards "frequently resorted to physical violence," because of their inadequate
numbers. Id. Stabbings and homosexual rape were also findings of the lower court. Id. at 681-82
n.3.
1 " Id. at 688.
159 Id. at 687. The Court viewed the conditions as a "whole." Id.
' 60 Id. at 686-87.
161 Id. at 685.
162 Id. at 688. Justice Rehnquist dissented from this aspect of the case because of the
broad remedial powers used by the district court. Id. at 710 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'" 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
'" Id. at 173 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.), 230 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Powell and Stevens, JJ., joined in the opinion announced by Stewart, J.
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in Estelle u. Gamble. 166 This opinion also noted that statutory punishments are
presumptively valid' 67 and codification is one measure of whether a constitu-
tional violation exists.' 68 Nevertheless, this opinion also declared that judicial
review of such democratically chosen punishments was warranted since the
eighth amendment was designed to protect individuals from legislative abuse of
power.' 69
The Court's eighth amendment analysis was further elucidated in In-
graham a. Wright.' 7° In Ingraham, the Court held that the eighth amendment was
inapplicable to public school disciplinary practices."' The Court concluded
that the clause was intended to protect only those citizens convicted of a
crime.'" The majority stated that since school children, unlike inmates, are
protected by public scrutiny as well as by the common law, their only constitu-
tional protection from cruel punishments is the due process clause of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. 17 " Thus, Ingraham reaffirmed that the eighth
amendment carved out a special protection for a few citizens.
In sum, the Court before Rhodes had outlined an eighth amendment
analysis applicable to prison overcrowding litigation. Ingraham made clear that
the clause affords special protection only to incarcerated citizens convicted of a
crime. Gregg reaffirmed the need for judicial review of state actions. With
respect to the standard of review, Hutto sanctioned the use of the totality ap-
proach and Estelle articulated four applicable tests. Although the Estelle Court
favored he contemporary norms of decency test and use of some subjective
evidence, the Hutto decision turned upon the dignity of man test and objective
penological evidence. Gregg reaffirmed the importance of focusing on the in-
dividual nature of the right through the dignity of man test.
A more recent Supreme Court decision, however, can be read as casting
doubt on the Court's eighth amendment analysis relevant to prison over-
crowding cases. In Bell a. Wolfish" 4- the double-bunking of pre-trial detainees
266 Id. at 172-73. See text at notes 143-46 supra. The opinion first stated that the "evolv-
ing standards of decency test" evaluates contemporary values based on objective indicia. Id. at
173. Since the "dignity of man" was beyond such norms, Justice Stewart reasoned, punishment
cannot be excessive. Id. Excessiveness, in turn, Justice Stewart declared, is measured in the
abstract by the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" test, and the "proportionality" test.
Id. Finally, the substantive limits ("universality") test could also be used to strike down legisla-
tion, under Justice Stewart's analysis. Id. at 174 n.10.
167 Id. at 175.
'" Id. at 179-80. The Court noted that since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
35 states had passed new statutes providing for the death penalty in cases of murder. Id.
t69 Id. at 174 n. 19 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258-69 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 371-73 (1910)).
1 " 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
17 ' Id. at 664.
'" Id. at 668-69.
273 Id. at 669-71. Surprisingly, the Court stated in dictum that after incarceration the
only applicable test of cruel and unusual punishment is whether there is "the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 670 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
174 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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was at issue. Because the case did not involve convicts, the Court, following In-
graham, refused to apply its eighth amendment analysis, instead deciding the
case under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'" The Court found
that detainees would be deprived of due process if the conditions of confine-
ment amounted to "punishment."'" According to the majority, regulations
imposed by prison officials arbitrarily or purposefully which did not further
legitimate governmental interests would constitute punishment.'" Concluding
that the double-bunking did not constitute punishment, the Court noted that
there is "no one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause'""
and that detainees enjoy at least the same constitutional protections due
prisoners.'" Bell, therefore, would appear to answer the question of whether
inmates of overcrowded prisons can invoke the eighth amendment.
Yet Bell should not be read as controlling in eighth amendment prison
overcrowding cases. The Bell Court's apparent departure from prior constitu-
tional analysis of conditions of confinement exists because Bell involved a fifth
amendment issue. The Bell Court relied on first 18° and fourteenth"' amend-
ment precedent in evaluating pre-trial detainees' rights through a balancing
test. Evidence of a due process injury was weighed against administrative
necessity. Unlike Bell, Estelle and Hutto relied upon precedent derived from the
historical development of the eighth amendment. The need for objective
penological evidence in proving a punishment has reached the threshold of un-
constitutional cruelty, therefore, remained unaltered by Bell.
Although Bell is not an eighth amendment case, its philosophical under-
pinnings have implications for future eighth amendment litigants. Despite
stating that "there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country,"'" the Bell Court took a regressive, hands-off view
towards prisoners' rights. Rather than adhere to the view that incarceration
necessitates only the loss of rights incidental to confinement,'" the Court
reverted to its 1948 language in Price v. Johnson that incarceration entails the
withdrawal of numerous privileges and rights.' 84 The Bell majority stated that
the operation of all correctional facilities is the province of the executive and
legislative branches of government.'" Moreover, the Court found that broad
deference should be given to the practices of prison officials because of the need
'" Id. at 535.
176 Id.
"7 Id. at 539.
"8 Id. at 542.
179 Id. at 545.
'° See, e.g., id. at 547 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S.
119, 128-29 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 826 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 321 (1971)).
18 ' See, e.g., 441 U.S. at 547 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976)).
"2
 441 U.S. at 545 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974)).
1 " See note 42 supra.
184
 441 U.S. at 545-46 (1979). See note 33 supra.
185 441 U.S. at 548 and 547 n.29.
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to ensure security.'" Consistent with their rulings in Estelle and Hutto,
however, Justice Marshall"' and Justice Stevens," 8 in separate dissents, ex-
pressed concern that by so focusing on the subjective intentions of officials
almost any punishment could be justified through the majority's analysis.
The evidence considered by the Bell Court could also mark a change in the
Court's eighth amendment analysis. The use of evidence in Bell differed from
that in Estelle and Gamble. The Court made a decision on the merits even
though the trial court had not fully compiled the available evidence regarding
the physical and psychological harms of double-bunking. 189 justice Marshall 19°
and Justice Stevens,"' therefore, dissented in the belief that such evidence was
essential for a proper adjudication of this issue. Moreover, the Court stated
"while the recommendations of ... various groups may be instructive in cer-
tain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional minima; rather, they
establish goals recommended by the organization in question." 192 Yet in Estelle
v. Gamble such standards were deemed essential in the evaluation of contem-
porary norms of decency.'" Moreover, in Hutto v. Finney expert evidence was
also critical in the Court's constitutional analysis.'" Consistent with his opin-
ion in Hutto, Justice Stevens dissented in Bell, and, wishing to apply an objec-
tive test, noted that the trial court found that viewed in totality " 'the living
conditions are grossly short of minimal decency.' "195 To the extent that Bell
marks a return to the hands-off philosophy of federal courts towards prisoners'
rights, and the abandonment of objective evidence as the most reliable in-
dicator of contemporary norms of decency, the decision dramatically changes
the Court's eighth amendment analysis.
Even if lower federal courts follow Bell's admonition to back away from
hearing prisoners' claims and to restrict the use of objective penological
evidence, the unique nature of the jail in Bell should render the case
distinguishable. The institution in Bell differed substantially from most
prisons. 198 The jail facility was very progressive, having rooms without cell
bars and little restriction on movement.' 97 Also, nearly all detainees were
'6 Id. at 547 (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
128 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 404-05 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)).
'a 7 Id. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 441 U.S. at 672 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'9° Id. at 572 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp.
1007, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1977) as proof that a full record may dictate a different result).
191 Id. at 596-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 543-44 n.27.
191 See text at note 148 supra.
' 94 See text at note 158 supra.
"9 441 U.S. 598 n.31 (quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
"6 The Court expressly distinguished the institution in Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F.
Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977). 441 U.S. at 543-44 n.27.
197 441 U.S. at 525, 543.
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released within sixty days.'" Conversely, many prisonsi" and jails are old,
sordid buildings designed for long-term housing. Accordingly, the Bell majority
acknowledged that in a different detainee case the number of people and the
type and duration of confinement could constitute "punishment. " 200
 This no
tion, that various factors of confinement are determinative of a constitutional
violation, is consistent with the totality of conditions approach in Hutto v. Fin-
ney. 2" Courts employing the totality approach, therefore, should be able to
distinguish the institution in Bell from less progressive facilities.
By 1981, then, the Burger Court had formulated discernable guidelines in
its eighth amendment analysis for finding prison overcrowding unconstitu-
tional. Ingraham made clear that in the classification as a "criminal" and the at-
tending loss of freedom the clause provides a few citizens with the special
guarantee of being free from cruel and unusual punishments. At the core of all
the Court's eighth amendment decisions, such as Gregg v. Georgia, is the view
that the clause safeguards these individuals from legislative abuses. Turning to
the standard of review, Hutto sanctioned use of the totality of conditions ap-
proach in the first tier of inquiry. In the second tier of analysis, Bell, a fifth
amendment case, did not impose a balancing test or require use of subjective
evidence. Thus, the dignity of man and other tests of cruel and unusual
punishment employed in Hutto and Estelle were not altered by Bell: proof of an
eighth amendment injury, through expert penological opinion, must be set
against an objective threshold of cruelty. Yet the hands-off view taken towards
prisoners' rights in Bell's dictum could justify a departure from eighth amend-
ment analysis in future cases. Whether the historical development of the clause
would continue unimpeded by Bell, to proscribe prison overcrowding as a cruel
and unusual punishment, was the issue before the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman.
II. RHODES V. CHAPMAN
A. The Lower Federal Courts
The plaintiffs in Rhodes v. Chapman were inmates double-celled at
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (the Facility) in Lucasville, Ohio. 202
Because of the prison's overcrowded condition, the plaintiffs initiated a class
action against the state officials responsible for prison administration. 203 Their
complaint alleged a violation of the eighth amendment 204 and sought injunctive
relief for non-temporary double-ceiling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 205
The Facility was built in the early 1970's. 206 A maximum security prison,
'" Id, at 543.
199 Id. at 562.
2°° Id. at 542.
2°' See text at notes 159-60 supra.
2 °2 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1007-08 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
200 Id. at 1008.
204 Id.
2°' Id. at 1022.
2°6 Id. at 1009.
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sixty-seven percent of its prisoners were serving either first degree felony or life
sentences."' The district court labelled the institution "a first-class facility. " 2°8
The court determined that there were 1,620 nonmedical cells averaging ap-
proximately 63 square feet in floor space. 209 Six hundred and sixty of these cells
were inside cells and contained no windows. 2 ' 0 Nine hundred and sixty of these
cells were outside cells containing one window each."' Three hundred and fifty
of the 600 inside cells were single at the time of trial. 212
 Almost all of the 960
outside cells were doubled."' Holding 2,300 prisoners, 214 the Facility was at
138 % capacity. 215 Nine hundred and sixty of the doubled cells housed inmates
who were free to move up to ten hours a day. 216 Three hundred and twenty of
the doubled cells housed inmates who were free to move only two to six hours a
week. 217 The district court concluded that about 75% of the inmates who were
double-celled could spend a considerable amount of their time beyond their
cell's bars. 218
The district court also found that the institution's meals were adequate ,"°
as were the ventilation system 22° and the facilities for visitation. 221 The court
found that violence had not increased out of proportion to the population 222
and that the inmate-guard ratio was acceptable. 223 The plumbing, lighting and
law library facilities were likewise found adequate. 224 The court did find,
however, that there were insufficient job opportunities for the prisoners. 225
Consequently, many of those inmates with jobs worked only about one hour a
day. 226 In addition, the court determined that double-celling delayed schooling
opportunities and interfered with studying. 227
 Medical and dental care were
20" Id. at 1011.
205 Id. at 1009. The Facility had a gymnasium, workshops, school rooms, day rooms,
two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber shop, library, outdoor recreation field, visita-
tion area, tomato garden, and dining rooms. Id. at 1010-11.
259 Id. at 1011. Each cell contained a cabinet night stand, wall cabinet, wall shelf',
lavatory with hot and cold water, mirror affixed to the wall, radio, heat and air vent near the ceil-
ing and a lighting fixture. Id. at 1011-12. Also, each cell had a 36 by 80 inch bed. Id. at 1011.
Doubled cells had a bunk bed attached to the wall over the floor bed. Id. at 1011-12.
21° Id. These cells measured six feet by ten feet, six inches by nine feet high. Id.
2" Id. These cells measured six feet, six inches by ten feet, six inches by nine feet high.
Id.
212 Id. at 1011.
213 Id.
214 Id.
415 Id. at 1020.
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found inadequate but no "indifference" to the needs of inmates was proven."'
Finally, the court found that counseling services were subtanstially denied to a
number of inmates. 229
After assessing the facts relevant to life at the Facility, the district court
embarked on its eighth amendment analysis. The court noted that judicial
restraint is not warranted with respect to state institutions when a federal court
is faced with a constitutional violation. 2 " The court then took a progressive
view of prisoners' rights in applying its standard of review."' In the first tier of
inquiry, the court adopted the "totality of conditions" approach. 232 In the sec-
ond tier of analysis, the court applied the "shock the conscience" and "evolv-
ing standards of decency" tests. 233
The court ruled that the conditions of confinement at the Facility were
cruel and unusual punishment for five reasons: the inmates' incarceration was
"long-term; "234 the Facility was holding 38% more inmates than its design
capacity; 235 the cells were designed, built and rated to house one man each; 236
most prisoners' time was spent in their cells with their cellmate; 237 and the
practice of double-celling at the Facility was not temporary. 238
 The court relied
on various correctional standards in ruling that contemporary norms of decen-
cy required at least 50 square feet of living space per inmate and the Facility
only provided 30-35 square feet per inmate to prisoners who were double-
celled. 239
After the district court's decision in 1977, the State of Ohio appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 24° The court of appeals affirmed the
228 Id. at 1016 (implicitly applying the standard for a violation established in Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
229 434 F. Supp. at 1016.
239 Id. at 1018 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1973)).
2"
 The court adopted the view of Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944),
writ dismissed, 148 F.2d 278, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). See note 42 supra.
232 434 F. Supp. at 1019.
233
 The language of the two-fold test questioned whether the punishment was "in-
tolerant or shocking to the conscience, or barbaric or totally unreasonable in the light of ever
changing modern conscience." Id.
234 Id. at 1020.
23s
236 Id. at 1021.
237 Id.
2" Id.
235 Id. The court cited the standards of the American Correctional Institution (75 square
feet), the National Sheriffs Association Handbook on Jail Architecture (1975) (70-80 square feet),
the National Sheriffs Association Manual on Jail Administration (1970) (55 square feet), the Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners
(1972) (50 square feet), the Report of the Special Civilian Committee for the Study of the United
States Army Confinement System (1970) (55 square feet). The decisions of Gates v. Collier, 423
F. Supp. 732, 743 (N.D Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977), Rodriquez v.
Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (D.P.R., aff'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) and 551 F.2d 877
(1st Cir. 1977), and Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom.,
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) were also persuasive to the court.
24° Chapman v. Rhodes, Order No. 78-3365 (June 6, 1980), reprinted in 12 Petitions and
Briefs of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rhodes v. Chapman, 25 (BNA No. 27).
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lower court's decision, 24 ' stating in its order that the district court had properly
used the totality of conditions approach. 242 The court also ruled that Bell o.
Wolfish, 243 decided after the district court's opinion, provided no authority to
reverse the case since the Facility was factually distinct from the jail in Bell. 244
The State appealed, again arguing that Bell required a reversal of Rhodes since
the basic necessities of the inmates were provided for. 245 The petition for cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court was granted on November 3, 1980.246
B. The Court's Opinion
Given the diverse standards of review applied by lower courts in their
eighth amendment analyses of overcrowding cases, 247 the Supreme Court in
Rhodes v. Chapman 248 was confronted with the need to enumerate clear prin-
ciples for evaluating conditions of confinement claims. 249 Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, 250 first discussed the evolution of the eighth amend-
ment from a narrow proscription on physically barbarous punishments to a
broad prohibition on nonphysical punishments as wel1. 2" Citing Estelle v.
Gamble252 and Hullo v. Finney, 253 Justice Powell then stated that prison condi-
tions can be viewed "alone or in combination" when evaluating a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment. 254 Thus, the majority adopted the totality of
conditions approach in the first tier of analysis.
Turning to the second tier, the Court articulated three applicable tests of a
cruel and unusual punishment: whether the punishment is "grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime;" 255 involves "the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" 255 (such as those "totally without penological
justification"); 257 or deprives "inmates of the minimal civilized measure of
241 624 F.2d 1099 (1980).
242 Chapman v. Rhodes, Order No. 78-3365 (June 6, 1980), reprinted in 12 Petitions and
Briefs of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rhodes v. Chapman, 25 (BNA No. 27).
245 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See text at notes 174-86 supra.
244 Chapman v. Rhodes, Order No. 78-3365 (June 6, 1980), reprinted in 12 Petitions and
Briefs of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rhodes v. Chapman, 25 (BNA No. 27).
245 Rhodes v. Chapman, Petition for writ of certiorari at 8-11, reprinted in 12 Petitions and
Briefs of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rhodes v. Chapman, 14-17 (BNA No. 27).
245 101 S. Ct. 353 (1980).
247 See text and notes at notes 68-135 supra.
245 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
242 Id. at 2398.
2" Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White and
Rehnquist.
253 Id. at 2398-99.
252 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See text at note 139 supra.
2" 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See text and notes at notes 159-60 supra.
254 101 S. Ct. at 2399 (relying on Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) and Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
253 Id. at 2398 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
255 101 S. Ct. at 2398 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint
opinion)).
257 Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
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life's necessities." 258
 Implicitly applying this two-tier standard of review the
Court held that no eighth amendment violation existed on the record before
it. 259
Specifically, the Court found that the delay of aids to rehabilitation, due to
limited work and educational opportunity, did not inflict any pain upon the
prisoners.'" Moreover, the five bases of the district court's holding were found
insufficient to prove that unnecessary or wanton pain was inflicted or that the
punishment was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed."' In
reaching this conclusion, the Court gave more weight to the "public attitude"
as evidence of objective indicia of contemporary norms of decency , 262 than to
the opinions of experts and standards of correctional agencies.
In dictum, the Rhodes majority stated that harsh or restrictive conditions of
confinement are part of the punishment criminal offenders can justly receive
since "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons."'" Further-
more, the Court stated that the legislature and prison officials can properly
weigh considerations affecting the adequacy of prisons.'" Because the majority
considered state legislatures and prison administrators sensitive to the dictates
of the Constitution,'" and to the problem of achieving the penal goals of
punishing justly, deterring future crime, and ensuring rehabilitation,'" lower
courts were cautioned not to be overzealous in granting relief to prisoners. The
Court did state, however, that where aged, deplorable and sordid prisons are
involved, federal courts should scrutinize eighth amendment claims."'
Justice Brennan, joined in his concurrence" by Justice Blackmun 269 and
Justice Stevens, expressed concern that the majority's dictum might encourage
federal courts to retreat from adjudicating prison condition cases.'" Tracing
prior prison condition rulings of the federal courts, Justice Brennan concluded
that "judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional dictates — not to
mention considerations of basic humanity — are to be observed in the
prisons. " 27 t Justice Brennan viewed the role of the judiciary as critical in the
258
 101 S. Ct. at 2399. The Court noted that this violates "contemporary standard[s] of
decency that [it] recognized in [Estelle v.] Gamble, 429 U.S., at 103-104." Id. The Court also
noted that the substantive limit test of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) was not in-
volved here. Id. at 2398 n.12.
"9
 Id. at 2400.
26° Id. at 2399.
261
	 at 2399-400.
262 Id. at 2400 n.13.
26' Id. at 2400.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 2401-02.
266 Id. at 2402.
267 Id. at 2401.
268 Id. at 2402.
269 Justice Blackman also submitted a brief concurrence for the same reasons as Justice
Brennan and found Hutto v. Finney persuasive authority. Id. at 2410. He concluded that the
federal courts are an "available bastion against unconstitutional cruelty and neglect." Id.
270
	 at 2402.
271 Id. at 2402-03 (emphasis in original).
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area of prisoners' rights because public apathy and the inability of inmates to
wield political power rendered the political process unresponsive to prisoners'
needs. 272 He then outlined an eighth amendment standard of review for prison
overcrowding cases.'"
In justice Brennan's first level of inquiry, the effect of the totality of condi-
tions upon the inmates is evaluated. 274 Once the conditions of confinement are
assessed, the court must then decide if such conditions survive a test of cruel
and unusual punishment. Justice Brennan's inquiry at this second tier con-
cerns whether the conditions comport with human dignity, 275 based on a
court's experience and its knowledge of contemporary standards. 276 In such an
analysis, Justice Brennan stated, courts must be receptive to evidence from
studies and various experts 277 and can compare the prison in question with
others in the United States.'" Acknowledging that prison overcrowding and
double-ceiling may at times result in serious harms to inmates,'" Justice Bren-
nan nonetheless concluded that the record before the Court failed to establish
that the conditions of confinement at the Facility violated constitutional
norms. 28°
Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter, 281 reiterated his language in Estelle
that the bedrock of the eighth amendment's proscription is the dignity of
man. 282 He concluded that the totality of conditions at the Facility did not
measure up to contemporary norms of decency.'" Justice Marshall stated that
such norms are derived from correctional standards, 2 " expert testimony 285 and
legislative action. 286 He disagreed with the majority's view that the apathy of
the political process can yield discernible contemporary norms. 287 He noted
that the voters had not democratically chosen double-celling, 2" and originally
built the Facility for single-celling. 289 Moreover, Justice Marshall contended
272 Id. at 2404.
273 See note 417 infra.
"4 101 S. Ct. at 2407. Justice Brennan noted the use of the approach in Hutto v. Fin-
ney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978). Id. at 2407 n.10.
275
	
at 2406 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
276 Id. at 2407.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 2409.
279 Id. at 2403-04.
280
	 at 2402.
'a' Id. at 2410.
282 Id. at 2412 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
283 Id. at 2413.
284 Id. at 2411 n.4.
285
	
at 2411. Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he conclusion of every expert who
testified at trial and of every serious study of which 1 am aware is that a long-term inmate must
have to himself, at the very least, 50 square feet of floor space ... in order to avoid serious men-
tal, emotional, and physical deterioration." Id. (footnote omitted).
286 Id.
287 Id. at 2414.
28a
	
at 2411. Justice Marshall stated that: "No one argued at trial and no one has con-
tended here that double ceiling was a legislative policy judgment." Id.
289 Id.
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that the Constitution mandates that federal courts help alleviate overcrowded
prison conditions that are harmful to inmate health. 29° Concerned with the
long-term impact of double-ceiling, Justice Marshall agreed with the Court's
ruling in Hutto v. Finney29 ' that deference should be given to the fact finder's
conclusions. 292
 Accordingly, he would have affirmed the finding of an eighth
amendment violation. 293
III. THE FUTURE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. The Implications of Rhodes v. Chapman
The Rhodes decision is an unsatisfactory precedent for eighth amendment
analysis. Essentially reverting to a hands-off philosophy, the basic tenet of the
decision is that the federal judiciary should defer to local decisionmakers'
policies. This philosophy, which substantially denigrates prisoners' right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment, is reflected in the standard of review
employed. Specifically, the rhetoric of a totality approach in the first tier of the
Court's analysis was not matched in reasoning. In addition, at the second tier
the tests of cruel and unusual punishment chosen were either inappropriate for
prison overcrowding cases or applied inconsistently with precedent. As a
result, lower courts finding the power to intervene in future prison condition
cases, despite the Court's admonition to retreat, will have to act without clear
guidelines as to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
In the first tier of the Court's eighth amendment analysis, the majority
established that conditions of confinement can be evaluated "alone or in com-
bination." 294
 This dual approach best ensures the functioning of the clause's
guarantee since the effect upon the imprisoned is thoroughly evaluated. 295 The
Court, however, employed only a broad totality approach 295
 and found that the
many positive aspects of life at the Facility offset the comparative problem of
double-celling. 297
 The Court did not focus solely on the combined negative
aspects of the prison as they affect some inmates, as did the Hutto Court. 298 Nor
did the majority examine overcrowding "alone." In effect, therefore, the fac-
tual evaluation was skewed to measure the life of the average prisoner, not that
of the least fortunate ones. Thus, although the rhetoric of the first tier's dual
approach was legitimate, its application was not.
The choice and application of the three major tests (four tests in total) in
the second tier of the Court's eighth amendment analysis 299
 are also subject to
criticism. To begin, the proportionality test has no useful application in the
290 Id. at 2414.
291
 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See text at note 162 supra.
292




 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
293
 See text and notes 67-87 supra.
296 See text at note 76 supra.
291
 101 S. Ct. at 2399-400.
298
 See text at notes 159-60 supra.
299 See text at notes 255-58 supra.
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context of overcrowded prisons. Both the lower courts 300 and the Supreme
Court in ingrahan23 " had indicated that this test is only useful where the degree,
not the kind, of punishment is at issue. Also, this test is proper only where in-
dividualized punishment is questioned, not where a heterogeneous group of of-
fenders are suing together."'
The pain test is also an unsatisfactory benchmark in prison overcrowding
cases. The pain test works an injustice to the prisoner since it focuses on
physical harm303 and prison security, 304 not psychological harm and the in-
dividual. This test also accords an unjustified presumption to state rationales
for inflicting pain. 305 Moreover, given the Court's refusal to consider expert
testimony and correctional standards as somewhat indicative of tolerable
punishment,'" the pain test becomes a wholly subjective evaluation of prison
officials' intentions."' Not surprisingly, the amici curiae brief of twenty-nine
states (and the Virgin Islands) under court order to rectify conditions in their
prisons urged use of this test."'" The Court, therefore, may well have employed
this test with an eye towards curtailing relief for prisoners.
Another test used by the Court, related to the pain benchmark, evaluates
whether the punishment is "totally without penological justification. ""3
Although this test also involves the problems of focusing away from the in-
dividual's plight, according unwarranted deference to state rationalizations
and encouraging judicial subjectivity in evidence evaluation,"° the plaintiffs
seemingly met this test on the evidence presented. The Court's articulation of
proper purposes — justice, deterrence and rehabilitation"' — were not proven
to be furthered by overcrowding the Facility. Indeed, in applying this pur-
posive analysis lower courts in other cases have found an eighth amendment
violation. 3 " The only state policy mentioned by the Court was prison
security. 3" Even if this policy can be seen as congruent with the three
enumerated penal purposes, how prison security might be furthered by confin-
ing more prisoners in a given amount of space was not explained. Lower courts
repeatedly have found that overcrowding jeopardizes security.'" The result the
300 See text at note 93 supra.
3 ° 1 See note 91 supra. Note that Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court in both
Rhodes and Ingraham.
30' See text and note at note 92 supra.
3°3 See text at notes 108-09 supra.
"4 Id.
355 Id.
355 See text at note 262 supra.
207 See text at notes 108-09 supra; Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality Of
Prison Life, 55 VA, L. REV. 795, 820 (1969).
'°° Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6-20, reprinted in 12 Petitions and Briefs of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Rhodes v. Chapman, 278-92 (BNA No. 27).
302 See note 257 supra.
31° See text at notes 110-11 supra.
311
	
text at note 266 supra.
312 See cases cited at note 110 supra.
3" 101 S. Ct. at 2400 n.14.
3" See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part,
651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 812 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449
U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Court reached can only be explained through an implied retribution theory of
justice: overcrowded living conditions are a just dessert for criminal conduct.
Even though such conditions inhibit rehabilitation, 315
 this notion of justice pro-
vides some justification for the punishment. Reading the decision in this man-
ner, lower courts could permit almost any penal practice to go unchecked.
The third major test employed by the Rhodes Court was the "minimum
civilized measure of life's necessities" test. 3 i 6
 Although this benchmark seem-
ingly focuses on physical needs only, psychological evidence is also considered
persuasive because this benchmark is analyzed like the contemporary norms of
decency test."' The Court, however, applied this test contrary to eighth
amendment precedent. Unlike the Estelle and Hutto decisions, the Rhodes ma-
jority did not give priority in proof to correctional standards and expert opin-
ion,"a nor did the Court defer to the lower court's discretion. 313 Rather, as in
its death penalty cases, 32° the Court found its own interpretation of public opin-
ion the most influential evidence of what constitutes contemporary norms of
decency."' Prison conditions and sentencing statutes, however, cannot be
properly evaluated with the same evidence. The public is unaware of the
nature of prison life. 322
 No legislation has ever sanctioned double-celling. 323 In-
deed, the voters chose through their legislatures to design prisons that would
not be overpopulated. 324
 Moreover, as the Court stated in Ingraham v.
Wright, 325
 because prisoners lack a real voice in the political process, 326 they are
deserving of special protection as a defenseless minority. This is not to say that
courts should impose their personal views upon the public. Rather, where the
public has remained silent on an issue, such as prison overcrowding, which
adversely affects a politically impotent group, the courts must find objective
penological evidence more persuasive of contemporary norms of decency than
their own evaluation of public opinion.
315 See text and note at note 336 infra.
See text and note at note 258 supra,
" 7 See text at note 128 supra. The Rhodes Court said the amendment "reaches beyond
the barbarous physical punishment at issue in the Court's earliest cases." 101 S. Ct. at 2398.
318 See text at note 148 (Estelle) and at note 158 (Hutto) supra.
319 See text at note 162 (Hutto) supra.
329 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1975) (joint opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (plurality opinion).
321
 See text at note 262 supra.
322
 See Comment, Confronting The Conditions Of Confinement: An Expanded Role For Courts In
Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 381 (1977); Note, Eighth Amendment Challenges to
Conditions of Confinement: State Prison Reform by Federal Judicial Decree, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 288, 290
(1979).
323 101 S. Ct. at 2411 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
924 Id.
323
 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See text at notes 170-73 supra.
326 See note 47 and text at note 272 supra.
[T]here is no prisoners' lobby present in legislative halls to compete with powerful
pressure groups seeking a share of the tax dollar. Again and again, it has been the
lower federal courts which have felt compelled to intervene to assure that state of-
ficials are recognizing and implementing the basic constitutional rights of
prisoners.
Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
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Had the Court evaluated expert opinion it would have found agreement
that overcrowding causes serious physical and mental injury. 327 The American
Medical Association and the American Public Health Association both en-
dorsed this opinion in their amicus curiae brief to the Rhodes Court.'"
Moreover, shortly after the Rhodes decision a Department of Justice study
added to the weight of this evidence. 329 In 1980 the Court itself conceded that
"overcrowding in prison . . . has been universally condemned by
penologists. " 330
Lower courts relying upon expert opinion have concluded that over-
crowding has caused tension and anxiety leading to violence, 33 ' riots, 332 the
spread of contagious diseases,'" depression from illness leading to suicide, 934
and disciplinary problems. 335 Overcrowding has also been found to have
327 101 S. Ct. at 2411 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
328 Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Medical Assoc. and American Public Health
Assoc. at 9-25.
329 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE
BEHAVIOR (1981).
3" United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415-16 n.11 (1980).
"' See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g in part 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1190 (D. Conn. 1980); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1977),
aff'g Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976), cert. denied, Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 915 (1978); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Costello v.
Wainright, 525 F.2d 1239, 1248 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'g 397 F. Supp. 20, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325 (1977);
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1280
(S.D. Tex. 1980), modd, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); West v. Lamb, 497 F. Supp. 989, 993
(D. Nev. 1980); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F.
Supp. 727, 733 (D. Md.), aff'd in part sub nom., Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir.
1978); Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp, 648, 655 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir.
1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 976 (D.R.1. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del.
1977); Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D.P.R.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976)
and 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (E.D. La. 1970).
332 See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977) (costing $10 million
plus lives). Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D.P.R.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1976) and 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977). See also Hart, In Michigan, Officers Rebel, Then Inmates Riot,
6 CORRECTIONS MAC. 53 (1981); Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
333 e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 1981) (risk), aff'g 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1181 (D. Conn. 1980); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1282 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or.), stayed,
449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Anderson v.
Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (D. Del. 1977); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016, 1018
(E.D. La. 1970).
334 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1980); Ruiz v. Estelle,
503 F. Supp. 1265, 1282 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modd, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Hutchings v.
Comm, 501 F. Supp. 1276, 1294 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810 (D.
Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.
1981); Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 655 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir.
1978); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977).
3" See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1282 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650
F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S.
1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Levine, 450
F. Supp. 648, 655 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978).
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retarded inmate progress in rehabilitation and educational programs,'" and
increased psychiatric problems and commitments. 337
 Courts have also found
overcrowding has reduced prisoners' privacy, 33° visitation time,339 and recrea-
tional periods. 34° In addition, deprivations of adequate health care, 34 ' in-
336 See, e.g., Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir.), aff'g  in part 450 F. Supp.
648, 655 (D. Md. 1978); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1282 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified,
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449
U.S. 1312 (Rhenquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Palmigiano v. Gar-
rahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 978 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
839 (1980); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 326 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd  sub nom., Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev 'd in part on other grounds, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
781 (1978); Costello v. Wainright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 32 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239
(5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev 'd per curiam on other grounds, 430
U.S. 325 (1977).
"' See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g in part 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980); Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir.), aff'g in
part 450 F. Supp. 648, 655 (D. Md. 1978); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1282 (S.D. Tex.
1980), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F. Supp. 1276, 1294
(M.D. Mo. 1980); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 812 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Mathis, 458 F.
Supp. 302, 305 (M.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Redman, 429
F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977).
336
 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.
Supp. 1265, 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modd, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Feliciano v. Barcelo,
497 F. Supp. 14, 36 (D.P.R. 1979); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or.), stayed, 449
U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Red-
man, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977); Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 589
(D.P.R.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) and 551 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1977).
"9
 See, e.g., Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S.
1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981).
5" See, e.g., Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir.), aff'g in part Nelson v.
Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Md. 1978); Lareau v. Munson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (D.
Conn. 1980), aff'd in part, 651 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265,
1279 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.
Supp. 1276, 1294 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D. Or. 1980),
stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F. 823 (9th Cir. 1981);
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 978 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977);
Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 589 (D.P.R.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) and 551
F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977).
' 4 ' See, e.g., Costello v. Wainright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525
F.2d 1239, 1247 (5th Cir.), reed on other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev 'd per curiam on
other grounds, 430 U.S. 325 (1977): The overwhelming evidence is that there is a direct and im-
mediate correlation between severe overcrowding, as now exists in the Florida Prison System,
and the deprivation of minimally adequate health care." Id. See also Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d
96, 101 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'g in part 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (D. Conn. 1980); Johnson v. Levine,
588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir. 1978); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810 (D. Or. 1980),
stayed, 449 U.S. 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Ander-
son v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (D. Del. 1977); Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp.
582, 588 (D.P.R.), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) and 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977).
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creased gastric illness,' 42 sanitation problems"' and destructive noise levels,'"
have all been attributed to overcrowding. Some courts have found proof of the
potential harm of rioting persuasive. 345 The Rhodes majority, however, did not
find evidence of the potential harm of rioting important.'" Psychological
evidence of the effects of overcrowding have helped courts to conclude that this
punishment is "more painful and enduring than the stocks or the rack. " 347
Yet the Rhodes Court did not consider psychological evidence alone sufficient
for an eighth amendment violation.'" Aside from medical and psychological
studies, correctional standards both in the United States349 and abroad35° have
also been considered important indicators of what experts find is tolerable
punishment. This wealth of expert evidence, therefore, so critical to lower
federal courts' prison overcrowding, eighth amendment analyses, was
disregarded by the Rhodes majority. While objective penological evidence does
not establish the constitutional rule, such data can shed light on whether the
342 See, e.g., Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S.
1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981).
343 See, e.g., Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir.), aff'g in part 450 F. Supp.
648, 657 (D. Md. 1978); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in
pan, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); West v. Lamb, 497 F. Supp. 989, 1000 (D. Nev. 1980);
Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 36 (D.P.R. 1979); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp.
1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977); Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 588 (D.P.R.), aff'd, 537
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) and 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom., 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds,
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
344 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1981); West v. Lamb, 497 F.
Supp. 989, 1000 (D. Nev. 1980); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 135 (D. Colo. 1980), aff'd
in pan, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Johnson v. Levine, 450
F. Supp. 648, 655 (D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy,
443 F. Supp. 956, 961 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839
(1980); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (D. Del. 1977).
345 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 1981); Burks v. Teasdale, 603
F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir. 1979); West v. Lamb, 497 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Nev. 1980); Anderson v.
Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1127 (D. Del. 1977) ("A ticking time bomb"); Costello v.
Wainright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 32 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 430 U.S. 325 (1977).
346 101 S. Ct. at 2400 n.14.
547 Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 123 (D. D.C. 1976). Most courts
finding a violation have found such evidence highly persuasive.
346 101 S. Ct. at 2400 nn. 13 & 15.
349 See note 239 supra.
35° See, e.g., the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisons
— Resolution 663c (LLIV) July 31, 1957 and 2076 (LXII) May 13, 1977 as cited and applied in
cases at note 120 supra. Foreign studies indicate that overcrowding leads to individual injuries
and institutional problems. For example, Japan's prisons are less violent than those in the United
States and Great Britain at least in part because of space differentials. Yoshihide Ono, The Present
Condition of Administration of Security Affairs in Prisons and the Problems Encountered, 91 KEISEI 12,
14-15 (June 1980). For an international tribunal's opinion suggesting that customary interna-
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established rule has been violated."' Yet in Rhodes the majority ignored such
expert evidence without any scrutiny of the methodology, substance or results
of the studies the district court found persuasive.'" Thus, instead of using ob-
jective sources of information to evaluate the eighth amendment claim, the
Court infused its own notion of what the apathetic public opinion is.
All of the tests applied by the Rhodes Court share one conceptual flaw: the
failure to focus on the dignity of the individual. The proportionality test
measures whether a punishment seems excessive in relation to the crime. Both
the pain and totally without penological justification tests focus on the state's
justifications rather than on the plight of the individual. The decency test, as
used by the Court, evaluates only public opinion. Although the "dignity of
man" test is arguably incorporated in the pain standard, as suggested in Gregg
a. Georgia, 959 the Court's application of the pain test, with non-objective
evidence, resulted in a reaffirmation of the status quo: the justifications of
prison officials and the tacit approval by an apathetic public did not, according
to the Court, render any pain of overcrowding unnecessary and wanton.
Therefore, a majority of the Court may no longer view the eighth amendment
as an evolving concept, responsive to the rights of the individual and safe-
guarded by judicial conscience.
That Rhodes signals the death knell of the dignity of man test is highlighted
by Justice Rehnquist's recent opinion in Atiyeh a. Capps. 354 In Atiyeh, Justice
Rehnquist, acting as a single Justice, stayed a district court order to eliminate
overcrowding at the Oregon State Penitentiary until Rhodes was decided."' He
declared that the "dignity of man" test was not the proper eighth amendment
benchmark. 356 He further stated that the state, bound by limited fiscal
resources, may declare retribution an equally permissible goal of incarceration
as rehabilitation."' Despite the district court's finding that overcrowding
caused serious physical and psychological harm, 356 Justice Rehnquist found the
conditions tolerable since prisoners cannot expect "a rose garden."'"
tional law requires a limit to prison population see Roberts (United States) v. United Mexican
States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77 (General Claims Commission 1926). See note 120 supra for
courts considering international standards.
3" 101 S. Ct, at 2414 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954)). Of course, the courts must evaluate the competence of experts
and studies. Id.
352 Id.
5" See note 166 supra.
354
 449 U.S. 1312 (1981).
355 Id. at 1318. Justice Rehnquist acted pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
1651(a) (1976), which provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id. at 1313.
356 449 U.S. at 1315. Justice Rehnquist referred to this language as the dicta of a plurali-
ty opinion. Id.
357 Id. at 1314 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184, n.30 (1976) (joint opinion).
358 See note 87 supra.
359
 449 U.S. at 1316:
I know nothing in the Eighth Amendment which requires that they be housed in a
manner most pleasing to them, or considered even by the most knowledgeable
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Although he conceded that the conditions at the overcrowded prison in the Hut-
to v. Finney litigation violated the Constitution, 38° he did not offer any
guidelines for determining what other set of institutional ills would violate the
eighth amendment. Justice Rehnquist also stated that three other Justices
would support his interpretation of the Constitution. 36 ' Therefore, although all
of the Justices sitting in Rhodes had adopted the dignity of man test in either
Estelieu or Hutto, 363 Atiyeh makes their failure to do so in Rhodes not so startling.
The restrictive view of prisoners' eighth amendment rights in Atiyeh is con-
sistent with Justice Rehnquist's opinions in recent non-eighth amendment
decisions. 364 Atiyeh could be viewed, therefore, as an opinion presaging a new
hands-off era of which Kelly Chapman and his fellow inmates were the first vic-
tims. Even though the Rhodes Court did not leave the purposes of punishment
to legislative judgment, 385 the concept of human dignity may disappear from
future constructions of the eighth amendment. This concept, in part, had
bridged the gap between contemporary norms and the goals of correctional
agencies in the Court's prior eighth amendment, conditions of confinement
rulings. 366 This chasm will now grow wider, thereby stifling judicial relief for
inmates of overcrowded prisons.
The near abdication of judicial review of prison conditions suggested by
Rhodes v. Chapman indicates that the Court again is leaning towards the "slave
of the state," retributionist view of prisoners and their rights. 387 Despite the
teachings of experience that state courts will not provide effective relief from
cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, 368 the hands-off rationalizations
of federalism 369 and deference to security-based prison decisions 3 " were both
evident in the Rhodes opinion.
This viewpoint was reflected in the type and application of the standard of
review employed. Although the result may differ where the state has not made
a good faith effort to comply with the clause, as where it ignores the problems of
penal authorities to be likely to avoid confrontations, psychological depression,
and the like. They have been convicted of a crime, and there is nothing in the Con-
stitution which forbids their being penalized as a result of that conviction.
Id.
369 Id.
361 Id. at 1313.
362 Burger, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J., joined in the
opinion delivered by Marshall, J.
363 Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, White, Powell, J.J., and Burger, C.J.,
joined in this part of the opinion delivered by Stevens, J.
361
	 e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 443 U.S. 119 (1977).
365 See text and note 266 supra.
366 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
(1976).
367 Compare the dictum of the court found in text at notes 263-66 supra with the language
of the restrictive view of prisoner rights at note 17 supra.
366 See note 45 supra; Gettinger, "Cruel and Unusual" Prisons, 4, CORRECTIONS MAG. 6-7
(1977).
369 Compare note 36 supra with the language of the opinion found at notes 264-66 supra.
37° Compare note 39 supra with the language of the opinion found at notes 264-66 supra.
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an old, sordid facility, the standard of review employed by the Court does not
compel that conclusion. The Court applied a balancing analysis more akin to
its first371
 and fourteenth amendment372
 cases rather than its prior eighth
amendment analysis in prison conditions cases.
At the turn of the century the Court had declared that the only limitations
on the legislature are "constitutional ones, and what those are the judiciary
must judge. " 979
 Now the Court has reversed itself, deeming the apathetic local
polity the interpreters of the limits of the powers of eighth amendment judicial
review. 374
 Rhodes v. Chapman thus fulfills, in part, the dark prophecy that "if the
mode of analysis adopted in today's decision were to be generally followed .
ironically, prisoners would be left with a right of access to the court ... but no
substantive rights once they get there."'"
B. The Aftermath of Rhodes v. Chapman
Although the Rhodes Court clearly adopted a hands-off policy towards state
prisoners' rights, the decision failed to offer a workable framework for resolv-
ing prison overcrowding cases. Lower courts are left to decide such disputes on
an ad hoc basis without clear guidelines for eighth amendment analysis.
Patchwork relief for prisoners will result. Two recent federal court decisions il-
lustrate this failure of the Rhodes Court: 376 Ruiz v. Estelle3" and Smith v.
Fairman. 578
The initial commentators of the Rhodes decision believed the case was easi-
ly distinguishable from cases such as Ruiz v. Estelle where physical harm from
overcrowding was well established. 579
 These commentators noted that because
after Bell v. Wolfish some courts followed the dictum of the Bell Court and
denied prisoner complaintsm while other courts felt the decision was confined
" 1 See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128-29
(1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 826 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321
(1971).
"2 See, e.g., Mechum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976).
"3
 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910).
"4 See text at notes 264-66 supra.
'" Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 147 (1977) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
'" See also Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S. 1312
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981). The decision of the district
court was vacated and remanded because of Rhodes and Wright v. Rushen 642 F.2d 1129 (9th
Cir. 1981), 652 F.2d at 823.
3" 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981).
373
 528 F. Supp. 186 (C.D. Ill. 1981).
3" The Lucasville Ruling: The Constitution Does Not Mandate Comfortable Prisons, 50, 51
(1981) 4 CORRECTIONS MAG. (citing Ruiz v. Estelle); Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1981, at 1,
col. 1.
'3° See Robbins, The Cry Of Wolfish In The Federal Courts! The Future Of Federal Judicial In-
tervention In Prison Administration, 71 J. of GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 220, 223 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Wolfish]. For a post-Rhodes decision applying Bell's analysis to detainees and
prisoners alike, see Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1296 (S.D.W. Va. 1981).
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to its facts38 ' Rhodes could also be distinguished in post-Rhodes overcrowding
cases. 382 Indeed, the Court in Be11383 as well as lower federal courts 384 had fac-
tually distinguished the Facility in Rhodes before the case reached the Supreme
Court.
Yet in Ruiz v. Estelle the overcrowding injunction issued by the district
court was stayed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit because of the
Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes. 385 The court of appeals in Ruiz found the
conditions in the Texas prison system similar to those at the Ohio Facility in
Rhodes. S 86 A survey of the district court's findings, however, renders this con-
clusion incredulous. While the Ohio Facility was 138% over design capacity, 397
the Texas prison system was at 200% capacity.'" The Rhodes case involved
double-ceiling in cells approximately 63 square feet each 389 but the Texas cells
averaged 45 square feet 39° and sometimes housed five prisoners each."' In ad-
dition, most inmates at the Ohio Facility involved in Rhodes enjoyed freedom of
movement."2 Conversely, in Ruiz the district court found that inmates in the
Texas prison system spent most of the day in their cells. 393 The Ruiz court also
found that brutality, extortion, rape, the spread of disease, suicide, psychiatric
commitments, disciplinary offenses and impairment of rehabilitation were a
direct result of the overcrowding. 394 In Rhodes, however, the harm to inmates
was primarily emotional and menta1. 393 Although not expressly considered in
Rhodes, the cost of compliance with the injuction was a factor in the Ruiz deci-
sion. 396 The court of appeals in Ruiz, therefore, may have implicitly relied
upon Atiyeh v. Capps: cost was a factor in the Atiyeh decision397 and the condi-
tions in the Oregon prison were worse than those in Rhodes. 398
381 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1287 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modd, 650
F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 814 (D. Or. 1980), stayed, 449 U.S.
1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), vacated, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F.
Supp. 122, 155 n.22 (D. Colo. 1980), aff'd in part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 1759 (1981). See also Wolfish, supra note 380, at 220.
382 See sources cited at note 379 supra.
383 441 U.S. at 543-44 n.27; 441 U.S. 572 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
384 Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 115 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J., concurring &
dissenting); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454, 482-83 (W.D. Mo. 1978); West v. Edwards, 439
F. Supp. 722, 724 n.1 (D.S.C. 1977).
383 Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 569 (5th Cir. 1981).
386 Id. at 567-69.
387 See text at note 215 supra.
388 503 F. Supp. at 1285.
389 See text at note 209 supra.
398 503 F. Supp. 1277 n.7.
391 Id. at 1278.
392 See text at note 218 supra.
393 503 F. Supp. at 1279.
394 Id. at 1281-82.
395 See text at notes 219-29 supra
396 650 F.2d at 569.
397 See text at note 357 supra.
398 See note 87 supra.
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Nevertheless, at least one court has distinguished Rhodes factually and
found an eighth amendment violation. The Federal District Court for the Cen-
tral District of Illinois ruled in Smith v. Fairman 399 that the conditions of confine-
ment at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Illinois constituted cruel and
unusual punishment."° Over 56% of the 1622 inmates were double-celled."'
The doubled inmates spent eighteen to twenty hours a day in cells 4°2 that
varied in size from 55.3 to 64.5 square feet. 403 Rhodes was found not to control
because Pontiac was built in 1871 404 and therefore lacked adquate ventilation,
sanitation, temperature control, quiet and windows in the cells."' Moreover,
the court distinguished the conditions because of the strain on all the prison's
facilities resulting from the long hours of inmate cell time. 405 The Smith court
concluded that "[t]tle conditions of the prison described in Rhodes seem almost
the antithesis of the conditions at Pontiac. " 407
With respect to the standard of review employed in Smith, the district court
relied on Hutto and Estelle in applying the totality of conditions approach 408 and
the shock the conscience, pain, decency and dignity of man tests. 4 D 9 The court
distinguished Bell factually and as a due process case." Language in Rhodes
that judicial intervention is warranted where an older, deplorable and sordid
prison is at issue" was central to the decision:412 The Smith court also found,
based on expert opinion, that the three purposes of punishment enumerated in
Rhodes 413 were not furthered by overcrowding and that the prison's population
posed a threat to security. 414 Critical to the court's reasoning was a 1977 Il-
linois statute requiring 50 square feet of cell space per inmate. 415 The court
characterized this law as embodying contemporary "civilized standards." 415
Thus, both penological evidence and legislative pronouncements supported the
finding of an eighth amendment violation.
The future of prison overcrowding litigation may well remain as disjointed
as the reasoning of the Ruiz and Smith decisions. Rather than rest on a sound
analytical framework, decisions may turn only on clear factual distinctions be-
991 528 F. Supp. 186 (C.D. III. 1981).
400 Id. at 201.
401 Id. at 188.
4" Id. at 201.
401 Id. at 188-89.
404 Id. at 187, 200.
405 Id. at 200-01.
"6 Id.
4" Id. at 199-200.
466
 Id. at 199.
4131 Id. at 199-200.
410 Id. at 199.
411 See text at note 247 supra.
412 528 F. Supp. at 200.
4" See text at note 266 supra.
414 528 F. Supp. at 200-01.
413 Id. at 200-01 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 38, $ 1003-7-3-3(b) (1977).




tween the case at bar and, on the one hand, Estelle and Hutto, and, on the other
hand, Rhodes and Bell. For example, because Bell, Atiyeh and Rhodes all involved
modern institutions, some courts may be more inclined to grant relief only
where an old, sordid prison is involved.
Yet courts faced with analogous institutional conditions could reach dif-
ferent results depending on the eighth amendment analysis employed. The
Rhodes opinion expressed a desire to retreat from hearing prisoners' com-
plaints, but the majority did not draw a discernable line indicating under what
circumstances overcrowding cases should be heard. Nor did the Court ar-
ticulate a sound framework of review. For example, the Rhodes opinion does
not answer questions such as what kind of review the judiciary should exercise
when a state correctional regulation permits overcrowding, whether a broad
totality approach should always be taken with respect to the conditions of con-
finement under challenge, or whether a state statute regarding minimum cell
space should be dispositive of the contemporary norms of decency test. Lower
courts appear free to apply their own interpretation of the Court's two-tiered
standard of review without fear of review where no violation is found because
of the Rhodes Court's admonition that federal courts should allow local deci-
sionmakers to further penological goals. While deference should be accorded to
the careful conclusions of the trier of fact, this deference should not entail giv-
ing district court judges the power to apply unsound law. Furthermore,
because of the inconsistency of Rhodes' eighth amendment analysis with the
Court's prior decisions, district court judges making a good faith finding of
cruel and unusual punishment could have their decisions overturned
unpredictably on appeal.
In short, future plaintiffs' chances of success depend less on the merits of
their claim than on the willingness of a court to read facts in a favorable light
and the resourcefulness of counsel to articulate persuasively a workable stand-
ard of review. Given the interests at stake, a more rational basis for deciding
these cases is warranted. The needs of inmates, state officials and the public
can only be served by establishing and consistently applying a coherent
analytical framework for resolving prison overcrowding, eighth amendment
disputes.
IV. PROPOSAL: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE
To ensure that a justiciable right remains inherent in the eighth amend-
ment where conditions of confinement, such as overcrowding, are at issue, a
coherent and substantive standard of review must be uniformly accepted. A
workable standard consistent with the historical development of the clause is
embodied in the following two-tiered analysis. 417
4" See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977):
Where the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the
physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of inmates and/or creates a
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One: Where negative conditions of incarceration are viewed
alone or combined, and
Two: a condition or a group of conditions significantly threaten
or impair the physical, mental or emotional health and well-being of
an inmate (and thereby create a probability of recidivism and future
incarceration) as determined by the most authoritative objective
evidence available, then such imprisonment violates societal notions
of the instrinsic worth and dignity of human beings in violation of
the eighth amendment.
In the first tier, only detrimental conditions of confinement would be analyzed
through both the narrow focus and totality of the circumstances approaches to
avoid prejudice in factual evaluation. Specifically, a narrow focus approach is
employed to ensure close scrutiny of the problem of overcrowding. Those
courts giving little weight to the sole problem of overcrowding would be forced
under the totality approach to consider the prison's problems as a whole. Use
of both approaches, therefore, ensures an equitable factual assessment of the
conditions under challenge. The broad totality approach which balances
negative and positive conditions of confinement is avoided since the least for-
tunate, not the average, inmates are of primary concern.
The second tier of this eighth amendment standard of review necessitates
judicial sensitivity to the individual's human dignity, in light of society's
mores. This sensitivity embraces the nontemporal nature of the right. Under
this proposed standard of review, in the absence of legislative action, objective
penological studies, expert testimony, and correctional standards would be
more authoritative evidence of what affects an inmate's health and well-being
than public opinion. If the body politic has spoken and sanctioned over-
crowding, such action is a factor which the courts must consider in exercising
judicial review. Mental and emotional harms would be relevant to whether
overcrowding has affronted man's dignity. Tests which fail to focus on the in-
dividual are inapplicable to this inquiry. Although rehabilitation is not re-
quired by the Constitution, 418
 the proposed standard incorporates the Rhodes
Court's view.that returning prisoners to society as useful citizens is a penal goal
that can only be frustrated by inhumane conditions of confinement*"
probability of recidivism and future incarceration, a federal court must conclude
that imprisonment under such conditions does violence to our societal notions of
the intrinsic worth and dignity of human beings and, therefore, contravenes the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Id: at 323. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 2407-08 (Brennan, J., concurring) where a two-tiered analysis is
seemingly suggested with the first tier entailing expert testimony and studies, not the second tier.
See text at notes 274-78 supra, where Justice Brennan's analysis is recharacterized to conform
with the framework of review presented in this note.
419 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
419
 Id. See cases cited at note 336 supra. In the words of Chief Justice Burger:
When you see a prison built a hundred years ago for 600 inmates and find it
crowded with 1,500 men with almost no recreational facilities, obsolete vocational




With this clear analytical model in place, appeals courts will be in a better
position to confine their review properly to examining lower courts' legal
standards, not left free to recharacterize their fact finding. Indeed, Rhodes can
be viewed as an impermissible recharacterization by the Supreme Court of the
district court's findings. 420
 Both courts used forms of the totality approach 421
and decency test. 422
 Yet the application of facially different formulae to the
evidence was where these courts departed. With a uniform standard, however,
appellate courts would be forced to give great weight to carefully considered
district court findings. Moreover, with aspects of the proposed standard
already well formulated, 423
 the articulation of uniform results would soon be
forthcoming . 424
 Accordingly, prison officials would be able to gauge the con-
stitutionality of their conduct and inmates would be assured of a justiciable
right.
The proposed standard is grounded in the notion that "persons are sent to
prison as punishment, not for punishment. "423
 To the extent that the retribu-
tion theory of incarceration explicitly expressed in Atiyeh426 has been implicitly
incorporated into Rhodes, 427
 the proposal will be rendered inapplicable or will
be applied only to affirm the status quo. 428
 Yet such a result would be contrary
to the principles embodied in the eighth amendment. The transformation of
judicial review into a rubber stamping of local decisions, designed to cut costs
or satisfy popular vindictiveness, would ignore some two hundred years of
eighth amendment and constitutional interpretation. Courts must proceed
with the understanding that "the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was designed
expressly to protect the weak and powerless from the passions, or the reckless
neglect, of the majority and its leaders." 429
 Citizens behind bars, albeit each
convicted of a crime, must never be forsaken by those "oath-bound to defend
the Constitution. , 7430
feet, I think you will understand the paradox of why so many of them come back.
Burger, No Men is an Island, 56 A.B.A.J. 325 (1970).
42° See 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2412-13 nn.6-7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
421 See text at notes 254 and 232 supra.
422 See text at note 258 supra and note 233 supra.
423
 See text and notes 68-135 supra.
424
 Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REV. 626
(1981).
425 Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original).
426
 See text at note 357 supra.
427 See text at note 315 supra.
426
 Although the Court seems unwilling to find cruelty where incarceration is motivated
by retribution, the Court would admit some limit to punishment exists, To find this threshold
courts need not depart from applying a two-tiered framework of review. Rather, only the ap-
proach to the conditions of confinement and the test of cruel and unusual punishment will differ,
as influenced by the philosophy taken towards prisoners' rights and federalism.
429
 Palmiglano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 978 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
430 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
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V. CONCLUSION
The eighth amendment evolved from a narrow proscription on physically
barbarous cruelties to a broad prohibition on any form of criminal punishment
that affronts the dignity of man. Essential to the evolution of the clause was the
casting aside of the "hands-off" doctrine to allow for increased judicial review
of state prison conditions. As a result, in the 1970's federal courts evaluated the
constitutionality of prison overcrowding. These decisions, however, resulted in
a plethora of standards of review and no uniform standard emerged. In Rhodes
v. Chapman the United States Supreme Court faced the prison overcrowding
issue for the first time. Yet the Rhodes majority also failed to articulate a clear
and workable eighth amendment standard, derived from prior Court decisions.
The Court implicitly reverted to a retribution theory of punishment that sanc-
tions long-term psychological suffering. In doing so, the Rhodes decision
departed from prior Supreme Court condition of confinement and eighth
amendment cases. Penological evidence was given insufficient weight in the
Court's decision. The Rhodes majority abandoned the "dignity of man" as a
relevant moral precept. Thus, the decision marks a retreat from historically-
developed principles but does not furnish a new, workable model. Absent a
viable standard of review, prisoners in overcrowded institutions will be af-
forded haphazard relief, at best.
Prior eighth amendment decisions, of both the lower federal courts and
the Court itself aid in the formulation of sound guidelines. A two-tiered
framework can be discerned from these decisions. What remains is the inser-
tion of the components of a uniform standard of review reflecting a consistent
judicial philosophy towards prisoners' rights. This note suggests use of the
totality of conditions approach in the first tier, and the dignity of man test in
the second tier. This standard is sensitive to the individual nature of the eighth
amendment's guarantee and responsive to the needs of prisoners. Objective
penological evidence must be considered. Judicial experience must be brought
to bear on each case to produce uniform results and meet the expectations of
state officials, inmates and the public alike. Void of such an historically-based,
constitutional analysis, the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishments may well be a hollow promise.
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